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Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare.  
Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border.  They decide whose name gets 
on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect 
for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute.  This article describes how judicial review 
predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when 
government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups.  It then 
proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy.  While it is rare that 
discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial review, courts’ role is often so 
circumscribed or deferential that the probability of uncovering problems almost certainly falls close to 
zero.  The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards.  Some 
decisions no doubt benefit from the speed and accountability that results from limiting judicial intervention.  
Yet judicial review’s evisceration probably makes it easier for some government officials to subtly 
manipulate their discretion to promote appealing political impressions, for others to engage in outright 
malfeasance, and for still other (more virtuous) officials to simply fail to learn from their mistakes –
whether these arise in deciding who to charge with a federal crime, who to designate as an enemy 
combatant, or how much money to freeze in a suspicious charity’s account.  The reliance on judicial review 
to manage discretion makes it hard to address these concerns in part because courts routinely define much 
of their work in terms of applying the same standard of deference to every case in a particular class, 
making it difficult to increase the stringency of review in some policy domains without making the costs 
allegedly prohibitive.  As a conceptual alternative, I propose a framework for systematically auditing 
samples of discretionary decisions and making those results public.  Audits help sever the connection 
between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion and the stringency of review, and avoid the 
potentially distorted picture of bureaucratic activity created by a litigation-driven process.  These 
properties make audits a promising supplement to judicial review in those instances where it is plausible to 
believe that more could be learned from incisively studying a subset of cases instead of superficially 
reviewing more of them.  Despite their potential value, such audits are almost never done by existing 
federal audit bureaucracies (the congressional Government Accountability Office and the department-
specific Inspector General Offices), nor does the legislature seem to do them itself in connection with 
oversight hearings.  I conclude by discussing some of the political and bureaucratic dynamics working 
against these audits and suggesting how they may be weakened. 
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INTRODUCTION
The problem is a familiar one. Government officials have staggering discretion 
when deciding what industrial plants to inspect for safety violations, whom to indict, who 
gets turned away by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at a port of entry 
without being allowed to plead her case for asylum, what allegedly terrorist assets to 
freeze, or whose name DHS puts on a government “no fly” list.  Despite an often-
mentioned social commitment to judicial restraints on public power,1 our laws routinely 
create and protect discretion instead of restraining it.  Which means public officials 
making certain crucial discretionary choices are, in turn, rarely restrained by courts –– or 
by anything except their own conscience or occasional fits of political attention.  All this 
discretion presumably allows executive authorities to make decisions quickly and 
efficiently, and the public to hold those authorities accountable.  It spares executive 
authorities the worry that courts will endlessly second-guess their decision when they 
decide what target to bomb or what assets to freeze.  Unfortunately, discretion also lets 
authorities shirk instead of learning from their mistakes, and abuse their powers instead 
of using them responsibly.  Which raises the pressing question of how public 
organizations with such considerable discretion will (be forced to) learn from their 
1 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(subjecting an informal, 
discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to judicial review on the basis of statutory 
language prohibiting federal aid for highways through public parks unless “no feasible and prudent 
alternative” existed).  Overton Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and 
stringency) of judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions.  But review remains either 
unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving national security, 
foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, public benefits, and investigation or 
prosecution.  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).  Regarding the trope that judicial 
review should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see Rachel E. Barkow, 
More Supreme Than Court?  The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); David Cole, Judging the Next 
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003);
James E. Pfander, article I Tribunals, article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
3mistakes, and how they will be policed against abusing their legal powers.  Although 
judicial review is often considered a central tool in preventing mistakes or abuses,2 the 
benefits of discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and policy debate about the proper 
stringency of such review.3
This article challenges the terms of that familiar debate in order to address the 
underlying question of how discretion should be supervised in a complicated political 
environment.  It tells the story of how judicial review systematically fails to effectively 
balance discretion’s costs and benefits, particularly when it comes to certain discretionary 
choices like the ones in the first paragraph, where the executive branch has special 
powers to significantly affect the fate of an individual, group or company.4  In the 
process, I show how the paradigm of judicial review often ill-serves the valuable goals of 
helping bureaucratic organizations learn from their failures and avoid political pressures 
that endanger their missions.  The problems arise both in national security and domestic 
regulatory contexts, domains that have been traditionally treated separately but 
increasingly blur.5  The article then shows how audits of targeted discretion can fill 
certain gaps left by deferential judicial review, or indeed, by the absence of any judicial 
review at all.
Part I begins by reviewing the extent of executive discretion, and the traditional 
approach courts and legislators use to control it.  What this brief examination highlights 
is how no plausible justification for executive discretion can deny the existence of a 
trade-off between the value of discretion and its potential cost.  Bureaucratic 
organizations need some flexibility to do their job.  On the other hand, any meaningful 
review process consumes resources, takes time, and reduces the freedom of choice that 
makes executive discretion valuable in the first place.  In response to this dilemma, courts 
routinely apply differing degrees of stringency when reviewing executive decisions.  
Their pervasive calculus of deference may take shape at legislators’ explicit behest (as 
with the CIA Director’s power to decide which employees are national security risks) or 
at the courts’ own hands.  Consider, for example, the fate of individuals that executive 
2 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (summarizing previous 
interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the Court’s conclusion that “Congress meant 
to hold federal agencies accountable by making their actions subject to judicial review.”); Rebecca L. 
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998)(emphasizing the 
alleged role of judicial review in promoting accountability).
3
 Voices on one side emphatically insist on greater opportunities for highly-stringent judicial review of 
executive branch actions.  See, e.g., Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 216 (“The vast quantities of unnecessary 
discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary power that 
is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked”).  Cole, supra note 1, at 
2567.  Similarly emphatic voices take the position in equipoise.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Ruth R. Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, 
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328 (2002).  Similar debates play out in the 
context of constitutional torts.  See, e.g., James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action As Individual 
Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395 (2003).  At least some of the debate turns on differing 
views about the extent to which a larger “political process” promotes “accountability.”  I discuss this in 
Parts III, and IV.
4 See Part I.a. infra.
5 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005)(“In war no 
less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken 
with close reference to standard principles of administrative law.”).
4authorities designate as enemy combatants.  Courts can increase the stringency of review 
by requiring more thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing the 
deference accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the absence of hearings) to the 
executive determinations themselves.6  Greater stringency of review presumably reduces 
the probability that someone would be labeled an enemy combatant by mistake, or 
because she is (for example) merely a political opponent of the president.  But it allegedly 
increases the resources that society must expend on the review process and that the 
executive branch must expend defending its decision.7  If stricter review consumes 
substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility of embarrassment for 
executive officials, it may also chill the authorities from designating individuals that 
should (in an ideal world) receive such a designation.  The same problem arises in the 
other contexts involving targeted discretion, such as freezing assets and making 
prosecutorial decisions.  In response, courts tend to vary the deference they give the 
executive or her agent.  
Yet this account neglects an alternative way of managing the costs and benefits of 
discretion besides adjusting the stringency or availability of judicial review.  The 
alternative is for some court-supervised or independent authority to use audits to sample 
discretionary decisions and to review them more thoroughly, rejecting the assumption 
that a given degree of review stringency should be applied to all cases in a class.  Despite 
their relative absence from discussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits 
of this kind are familiar from a panoply of private and public sector contexts – as with 
insurance companies that review a small slice of their closed files to learn from their past 
behavior, tax enforcers who audit a sample of the public at random (or nearly so), or 
courts handling complicated class actions and picking out a sample of cases from the 
class to learn more about the merits.  Because they are an alternative to imposing a single 
6 Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988)(finding CIA director’s power to fire employee on 
national security grounds committed by law to agency discretion) with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center 
v. Bureau of Land Mgt., 387 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2004)(finding, under an arbitrary and capricious standard 
that the court understood to require “hard look” review,  that the Bureau of Land Management’s 
environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the cumulative impact of the sales).  I don’t mean to 
minimize the subtleties of the variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts 
(and even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant.  Separation of powers, 
deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial deference to expert determinations of 
government agencies, and statutory interpretation techniques all figure in this process.  Even the two cases I 
cite here represent extraordinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decision 
are also different.  The point here is how nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines require (or at 
least allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and benefits associated with discretion, and 
different ways of striking that balance are associated with distinct degrees of stringency in the court’s 
review of some executive decision.  As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when 
applying these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the review of 
discretionary executive decisions.
7 See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Heckler v. Chaney, 1984 WL 
566059, 4 (November 23, 1984)(“[R]espondents’ submission, if accepted, would allow anyone to seek 
judicial review of the agency’s decision not to bring enforcement proceedings under any portion of the 
Act.”)(emphasis added); Brief for the Respondents, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020,  12 (March 29, 2004)(arguing that further factual development of the 
circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant’s designation as such “would divert the military’s 
attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan…”).
5standard across the board, audits have the potential to disrupt the familiar, repetitive 
debate about whether our society deserves greater court protection of its rights and 
prerogatives.  Put differently, even if one accepts the executive branch’s strident (and 
frequently questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if discretion were more easily 
reviewed in court, there remains a viable option for reviewing that discretion without 
incurring the various costs associated with traditional judicial review. 
This wouldn’t matter much if the conceptual choice between deferential review 
and audits were a mere quirk of form.  Not so.  Under quite reasonable assumptions, 
deferential judicial review could be worse than review using audits even though the costs 
may be similar.  The absence of audits, conversely, diminishes our system’s capacity to 
detect executive branch manipulation.8  It may also dampen the incentives of executive 
branch bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and makes it easy for key actors in the 
system to avoid articulating (either in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are 
actually supposed to govern executive discretion.  Together these dynamics ultimately 
affect the costs and benefits of laws that grant the executive branch discretion in the first 
place, and also the political context governing those grants of legal power.  In principle, 
we should expect an accountability-power trade-off:  some people and groups should be 
willing to see the executive branch get more power but only if it could be reliably 
supervised.  While the devil may be in the details, Part II surveys some of these problems 
and discusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Little of this thinking has influenced the review of the executive branch’s 
discretionary decisions.  Instead, executive discretion is supposed to be policed through 
two standard mechanisms quite unlike the audits I described above.  At one end of the 
spectrum lie courts that seem to conceive of the task at hand in terms of articulating or 
(on the basis of legislative enactments) applying different standards of deference to 
review all discrete decisions of a particular kind (i.e., all enemy combatant designations, 
all personnel decisions in intelligence agencies, all decisions by OSHA to initiate 
investigations, and so on).  At the other end lie mechanisms that combine some kind of 
external inspection of agency practices with political safeguards: Inspector General’s 
Offices, the Government Accountability Office, congressional oversight, and similar 
procedures that produce reports on financial management, discussions of organizational 
problems, hearings, and testimony.  While the court-centered end of the spectrum suffers 
from the aforementioned limitations, one might imagine that review provided by audit 
bureaucracies and the legislatures could fill the breach.  As Part III shows, it’s not that 
simple.  Rarely if ever do these mechanisms focus on substantively evaluating a discrete 
sample of targeted executive decisions rather than the finances or performance of entire 
programs, and some kinds of decisions (like prosecutorial charging decisions) seem a 
8
 Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically solve organizational learning 
and accountability problems involving the law.  As I note in Part II, a great deal depends on details of 
institutional design.  The impact of an audit system also depends on the public’s response, and the 
institutional dynamics affecting that response.  Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely 
provide a false sense of security – which is in some sense precisely my criticism of judicial review in many 
of the contexts I discuss in this paper.  Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more likely to provide 
precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the potential advantages that a carefully-
structured audit system could generate.  For a thoughtful discussion of role of audits and the pitfalls in 
designing them, see MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
6trifle too mundane to attract much attention from our existing auditing bureaucracies.  In 
fact, using new data complied from samples of reports from the GAO and Inspectors 
General, I show how these audit bureaucracies do nearly anything except the audits of 
executive discretion I advocate here.
Why, then, have audits of targeted discretion remained largely irrelevant in 
reviewing executive discretion?  In Part IV I discuss four reasons, which together help 
make a more general point about the likely disconnection between what we expect of our 
public law and what public bureaucracies actually deliver.  The first is a frequent failure 
to distinguish between different types of executive discretion that may call for distinct 
kinds of review.  “Targeted” discretionary decisions (applying an implicit or explicit 
legal standard) are most obviously suited for audit review.  Broad policy judgments that 
lie at the core of regulatory rulemaking, on the other hand, may be harder to review in 
this fashion.  Second, key players may lack an organizational or policy interest in audits 
because they have an investment in perpetuating some aspect of the current system.  The 
deference approach may yield greater discretion on balance to the executive because it 
makes reviewing authorities deferential across the board.  On the other side, advocates of 
restricting discretion may also go for broke through legal and legislative strategies that 
apply across the board, and may galvanize supporters with troubling scenarios.  Third, the 
current system is boosted by some inertia borne from adversarial adjudication, where 
lawyers tend to conceive of their role as zealous advocates on behalf of individual clients 
and reviewing institutions (especially courts) are conceived as direct protections of the 
rights of similarly-situated individuals.  Finally, the existing audit bureaucracies fail to 
use their legal authority to do audits of targeted executive discretion in part because of a 
persistent preoccupation with the sort of financial auditing mission that initially led to 
their creation.  
Together these factors may lock in suboptimal institutional responses to serious 
legal problems.  Through this case study and thought experiment I hope to highlight three 
crucial challenges that follow from that sort of lock-in, and that may be relevant to a large 
class of problems: (1) the importance of recognizing the inherent limitations of judicial 
review as a means of managing government discretion, (2) the value of envisioning new 
institutional designs to manage discretion more effectively, and (3) the need for 
reasonable strategies to implement those designs in a politically complicated world. No 
one should underestimate judicial review’s enduring value.  Instead, it is the stale 
discussion of its merits as a means of promoting accountability that must be transcended.  
Perhaps the most striking thing about executive discretion is that the problem of trading 
off its costs and benefits is so pervasive, yet the means of balancing those costs and 
benefits has remained unduly narrow.  This article begins the task of broadening the 
scope of potential solutions and understanding the forces that shape our perceptions of 
whether those solutions even exist.
7I.
AUDITS ENHANCE THE SUPERVISION OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Ordinary citizens tend to carry around a few simple mental narratives about the 
stakes involved when government makes such discretionary decisions.9  One of those 
narratives recurs perhaps more often than any, and goes something like this.  Government 
bureaucracies get power from legislators, the “people” who elect the legislators, or maybe 
even (among the sporadic, more darkly cynical observers) a shadowy conspiracy of 
oligarchs.  The frontline employees and officials who work in government bureaucracies 
then use their power to regulate working conditions, protect the air, screen containers, 
safeguard the borders, or to accomplish a host of other goals that the principals care about 
and could not be achieved without giving the government such powers.10  But since that 
power can be abused, those to whom it is entrusted must be policed to make sure they 
adhere to the proper (legal) rules and standards that are supposed to govern their 
decisions.11  In societies like our own, courts are assumed to play a particularly important 
role in doing that policing.12 Our public credo makes much of how courts promote 
accountability.  They scrutinize instances where government uses discretion to target an 
individual or group.  In doing so, they are assumed to help the public learn what ails the 
government’s efforts to protect our welfare and security.13  They’re routinely assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that people’s rights are respected, that agencies don’t exceed 
their legal powers when they promote security or safety, and that the law is correctly 
applied to the millions of people and organizations who are affected by government every 
day.14
The preceding assumptions about the role of courts are, of course, wrong. The law 
may commit a decision to agency discretion.  Courts may be forced by law or custom to 
review executive branch actions only with extreme deference.  Judges may lack 
jurisdiction.  In short, when courts weigh in on a great many discretionary decisions to 
make sure they’ve been done right, they may have little choice but say: “Glad you’re 
doing such a great job.”15  Sometimes legislators explicitly confer enormous discretion, 
9 See Mark Schlesinger and Richard R. Law, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors, 94 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 611 (2000).
10 See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988); Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, On Political Representation, 29 
BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 109 (1999).
11 See Barry R. Weingast, Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
24 (1997).
12 See, e.g., Martin Shaprio, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J., 1487 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and 
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003).
14 See generally Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional 
Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1998).
15
 Courts can restrain egregious government conduct of some kinds, such as those that might give rise to 
viable constitutional tort claims.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).  But courts proceed with extreme caution in this realm given their 
concern that the scope of a claim they recognize (and the remedies they might make available) would 
8prohibiting all or most judicial review of certain decisions, by embedding a limiting 
provision in an agency’s legal mandate.  The law says that the CIA Director, for instance, 
has authority to fire employees for being national security risks.  It also says he has the 
power to define what “national security risk” means, which lets him arbitrarily fire 
someone for being gay (he has).16  In other cases, executive agencies have discretionary 
powers because prevailing statutory interpretations and constitutional provisions imply 
the existence of such power.  That’s why prosecutors have the power to choose whom to 
charge with little concern that their choices will be questioned in court or in any other 
legal forum.17  In still other cases agencies have discretionary power because courts and 
other external observers only review certain kinds of executive decisions with great 
deference, which leaves the president, the agencies he supervises, and similar executive 
authorities with residual control over governance.18  The resulting, legally sanctioned, 
executive discretion lets agencies act swiftly, learn to deal with unfamiliar situations, and 
(it is often believed), lets the principals hold the executive branch of government 
accountable for what it’s done.19  But those powers carry risks as well as rewards – and 
striking a reasonable balance between flexibility and constraint turns out to be devilishly 
difficult. 
A.  Executive Discretion is Pervasive
Discretion, as I define it, is the (explicit or implicit) legal flexibility to use 
government power – including, but not limited to, personnel, budgets, information, and 
legally-sanctioned coercive authority) to affect the world.  Government officials use some 
discretion virtually every time they do something.  Though government actions are rarely 
purely discretionary, neither is discretion ever entirely absent.  What discretion is present 
may come from explicit statutory language, an implicit interpretation of a statute or 
constitutional provision, or it could be the result of a certain institutional structure 
involving extremely deferential external review, which gives government officials a lot of 
power.
Since there’s no such thing as a total absence of discretion when government pays 
out welfare support, prosecutes, and otherwise applies the law, the distinctions that 
lawyers and policymakers fight over tend to be about whether to give the executive 
branch relatively more, or relatively less discretion compared to a certain baseline.  When 
the President’s lawyers talk about the benefits of discretion, they’re implicitly accepting a 
baseline state of the world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government 
interfere with some of the more valuable properties associated with executive discretion.  See generally 
PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
16
 Webster, 486 U.S. at 602-04.
17
 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).  As Culp Davis cogently observed, “[a] judicial trial is 
an acceptance of a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute, not a review of it.  Even a quick finding of not guilty 
may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution.”  Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 209 n.21.
18 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
19 See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 793 (2004).
9action.20  That’s a familiar position in the United States and in most other developed 
nations (and many developing ones).21  In criminal prosecutions, voting rights cases, and 
labor law injunctions, for example, some action of the executive branch (such as 
subjecting someone to the detriments associated with being convicted of a crime) 
depends on convincing a court to do something.  Observers and policymakers may have 
different political views about how easy it should be to impose a labor injunction (for
example) or convict someone of a crime.  But if they don’t succeed in persuading the 
legislature to water down the substantive standard that applies, they’ll have to mount a 
vigorous case before a court that is quite persistently unwilling to simply defer to 
executive discretion.  Even when such review is not occurring, the executive branch 
presumably labors in the shadow of the embarrassing possibility that a license grant, a 
regulatory rule, a criminal conviction, or a statutory enactment will be invalidated.22  This 
implies that we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline of 
relatively intrusive judicial review.  
20 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 
724020 (March 29, 2004).  The government’s language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers 
for the executive branch have taken in this Administration – and not dramatically different (on the core 
issue of deference – from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations.  It states:
As this Court has observed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority 
of the Executive in military and national security affairs.  The customary deference that courts 
afford the Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context.  A 
commander’s wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a 
quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief 
authority.  Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations and 
intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and 
make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe. 
Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
21
 This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal systems, many of which 
assign quite different roles to judicial institutions.  The point is that it’s quite common for those different 
systems to assign considerable importance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts.  See 
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 
101 (1994).
22
 Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is enormously complex, but 
a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to this effect using qualitative or quantitative 
methodologies in different contexts.  For some cogent examples, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)(suggesting that NHTSA’s reliance on costly recalls of 
questionable safety effects rather than prospective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of 
intrusive judicial review in rulemaking); Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in 
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998)(discussing the impact of the 
“ossification” of rulemaking, where judicial review among other factors shapes agencies’ willingness to use 
regulatory authority); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower 
Courts, 47 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 205 (2003)(analyzing whether changes in the ideological composition of lower 
courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to grant permits for development of 
wetlands, and finding that a standard deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the 
lower courts decreased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by 14%).
10
B.  Discretion Is Routinely Managed Through Variations in Standards of Judicial 
Deference
Courts and legislatures provide for such review in accordance with a 
straightforward pattern.  Whether because of their own decisions or because of legislative 
mandates, it should hardly seem surprising that courts and legislators seem to manage the 
costs and benefits of discretion by varying the deference they give the executive or her 
agent.  Some decisions get more deference, and others get less.23 As I use the concept 
here, deference is not quite the same thing as the “standard of review” that a court of 
appeals uses to review lower courts or administrative decisions, nor is it confined to 
courts’ review of decisions that allegedly turn on agency statutory interpretations (though 
it can certainly encompass this).  Instead the concept applies to several considerations 
that together determine the stringency of a court’s review of an executive decision.  That 
bundle of considerations includes the standards of review, the extent of required 
procedures a court can monitor (i.e., the “meaningful opportunity to be heard” mentioned 
in Hamdi),24 and routine practices that courts use to decide on the extent of the executive 
branch’s flexibility to make some kinds of decisions.25  Stringency of review, as I define 
it, encompasses among other things the standard of review governing appeals of specific 
administrative actions.  It is affected by the degree of outright deference given to the 
executive branch, and the extent to which courts find through constitutional or statutory 
interpretation that a particular decision to be committed by law to agency discretion.  
More stringency means a combination of: more rigorous procedures (such as those that 
might be imposed on due process groups) that the government must follow before 
imposing a cost on someone, a less permissive standard of review for the factual findings 
of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less overall deference to the 
government’s decision itself.  In my terms, when a court says that a six-page declaration 
from a Defense Department bureaucrat is enough reason to detain someone for an 
indefinite period of time, it is being more deferential.26  When a court says that’s not 
enough, because the executive must provide a “meaningful opportunity” for someone so 
designated to get notice of the factual basis for their detention and to contest their status, 
it is being less deferential.27  And when a court says that a person cannot be detained 
(given the legislature’s current authorization) unless someone is charged with a crime, it 
is being even less deferential. 
The same pattern can be observed when comparing, for example, deferential 
versions of the sort of “arbitrary and capricious” and “substantial evidence” review to the 
role of a typical court considering the veracity of a prosecutor’s charging document in the 
course of a criminal trial.  A conviction generally requires convincing the court of an 
argument about the particular meaning of a statute, and proving facts establishing the 
23
 For cases, see supra note 6.
24
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
25
 I’m obviously assuming here that court decisions actually matter, and that (in many cases) they do have 
the potential to greatly affect how the executive branch does its work.  That’s an assumption that makes 
considerable sense given how much time, money, and energy interest groups spend litigating, executive 
branch lawyers spend responding, and legislators spend writing laws that are supposed to affect the 
litigation process.
26 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003).
27 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
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presence of “elements” of the crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.”28  Specific cases may 
involve different doctrinal bases and legal subtleties.  But across this diverse doctrinal 
territory, one might imagine that a given point on a continuum (ranging from extreme 
deference to pronounced stringency) could reflect the extent of the hurdles government 
must overcome to prevail in the judicial arena.  It also serves to determine the costs 
various players will bear once the review process has played out; less deference forces 
both the executive and the court to devote greater resources to resolving the relevant legal 
and factual questions. The important distinction here is not in the specific doctrines or 
procedures involved, but in the fact that under a standard of greater deference (whether 
determined by legislative enactments or subsequent judicial interpretation), the executive 
branch retains a greater chunk of power to decide how to use its discretion.  
When deciding how much of that power to let executive authorities keep, courts 
and legislators make an implicit assumption across a bewildering array of contexts.  They 
appear to make decisions premised on the assumption that a particular degree of 
stringency in review will apply, once articulated (and assuming it is actually followed) 
across the board to all similarly-situated cases.29  This is perhaps partly a function of 
stare decisis and prevailing conceptions of horizontal equity, or perhaps even partly 
driven by inflated conceptions of judicial power to ensure that like cases are treated 
similarly.  In fact courts treat horizontal equity as an important value, where deviations 
must be defended.30 The same goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts 
implement.  This renders troubling (in the eyes of many principled observers) the 
prospect of increasing the stringency of review without making the various costs 
prohibitive.
C.  Audits Can Substitute For, or Supplement, Judicial Review
Now suppose court review isn’t available, that it is considered too costly for some 
reason, or that we want to supplement the allegedly laudatory impact of judicial review 
on executive behavior in some way.  How else might legislators and the public police 
executive discretion?  One answer can be found in what government organizations 
repeatedly do to the public: they audit. By thinking about alternative institutional 
arrangements, such as audits, we can get a better sense of the practical and political 
opportunities to nudge bureaucracies with discretionary legal powers away from failure.  
We can also clarify what our underlying goals are when discretion is reviewed, thereby 
trading off various possible ways of solving some of the institutional design problems 
28 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
29 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)(noting, in the context of reviewing an alleged 
retaliatory demotion and defamation claim against a federal official, that “[t]he costs associated with the 
review of disciplinary decisions are already significant – not only in monetary terms, but also in the time 
and energy of managerial personnel who must defend their decisions”).  See also Langevin v. Chenango 
Ct., Inc. 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971)(finding that judicial review of the Federal Housing Agency’s 
discretionary actions resulting in rent increase approvals in part on the basis that an unacceptably high 
number of rent increases would be subject to review).  Here and in similar cases, the Court’s discussion of 
costs implicitly assumes that whatever costs are generated by the stringency of review the court adopts in 
the present case will be applied to all future cases with similar characteristics.  See supra note 7 for 
examples of briefs making this argument.
30 See Cole, supra note 1, at 2567.
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associated with audits (like how courts should be involved, or whether audits should be 
publicly disclosed) that might be better or worse suited to achieving particular goals.
As I use the term here, an audit is a sustained, careful evaluation of a discrete 
decision drawn from a larger pool.  In contrast to financial or more wide-ranging 
management audits, the audits of targeted discretion I discuss below treat each 
discretionary decision, like a decision to label a group as a specially designated terrorist 
organization, as the unit of analysis.  Audits of targeted discretion would evaluate the 
information supporting the decision, its origins and reliability, contradictory information, 
and the broader context in which the decision took place Though audits rarely take 
precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to learn what’s going on 
in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
Audits associated with taxation are among the most familiar.  They take place in 
some form in most reliable tax collection systems, which, like our own, rely partially on 
self-reports.31  Many tax audits are not entirely random, which reduces their ability to 
provide a reliable picture of what’s going on in the world.  The less random the audits 
are, the less generalizable their results – and the easier it might be to evade them by 
avoiding the behaviors that raise the probability of being audited.32  From this 
perspective, one of the “purest” tax auditing programs in recent years (in the sense of 
being almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (or TCMP).  The following discussion emphasizes the tremendous 
informational value of such a program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on the 1988 TCMP.  
Noncompliance with individual and corporate income taxes was estimated to cost 
the Treasury about 18 percent of actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of 
revenue would have amounted to $223 billion.  An average tax rate of 22 percent 
implies that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate 
deductions.33
Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure out the size of the “tax 
gap.”  The program’s cancellation has limited the government’s ability to know how 
much is paid relative to what is owed, and who’s particularly likely to be responsible for 
that gap.34
Auditing-type activity also shows up in the pages of court opinions.  Suppose 
Federal health care regulators and investigators suspect a health care clinic or nursing 
home of overcharging the federal government on Medicare payments.  The government 
sends in investigators.  Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by reviewing 
each one of its files, investigators use audits to calculate the amount.35  Courts reviewing 
31 See generally JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES (2004).
32
 This last point is at the core of the explanation for why a “mixed strategy” is so valuable in the 
framework of game theory.  See DAVID A. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY, 381-83 (1993).
33
 Slemrod and Bakija, supra note 31, at 175.
34 Id. ([T]he estimates are based on data that is now over fifteen years old.  But thes are the best numbers 
around.”).
35 See Chaves Co. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (DC Cir. 1991).
13
this practice have repeatedly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor 
one with due process.36  “Sample audits” also make an occasional appearance in class 
actions.  When they do, courts (and litigants) confronted with an entire class of claims 
take a sample of those claims to get a better sense of what’s going on.37
Something similar happens in the private sector, where “your call may be 
monitored for quality assurance.”  The point is not just to prevent abuses or mistakes in 
discrete cases.  It’s to learn more – as with tax collection -- about what’s really happening 
and how it can be improved.  For example, insurance companies sometimes perform a 
process of “closed file review,” where they spend more money figuring out whether the 
amount of money paid out for a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than 
they do paying out the claim itself.38  It’s not hard to see why managers would rather 
know what their employers are doing.  Nor is it surprising that random audits (at least 
when they happen with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the people or 
organizations being overseen to evade detection.39
Not surprisingly, the federal government has created several bureaucracies 
capable of using audit-type techniques to investigate what government agencies actually 
do with their discretion.  Very occasionally, government agencies audit the performance 
of their own workers.40  The Government Accountability Office (originally the General 
Accounting Office, or GAO) was created early in the 20th century primarily to help 
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.41  In 1974, legislators 
gave the GAO power to review and analyze the implementation of government programs.  
Shortly thereafter, beginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten 
years or so, legislators began creating “Inspector General” offices in the federal 
government.42  Like the GAO, the Inspectors General have the legal power to investigate 
how federal officials use their targeted discretion.  The existence of these structures 
indicates the potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the federal 
government uses its targeted discretion.  Whether these bureaucracies actually perform 
such audits is another matter, to which I return below.
To understand how audits would work, imagine a world much like our own, 
where some decisions (like environmental regulatory rules, voting rights regulations, and 
criminal convictions) are subject to stringent judicial review.  Other executive branch 
decisions (like special designation as a terrorist organization or as an enemy combatant) 
are subject to less stringent review.  For fairly obvious reasons, we (or if you prefer the 
parlance of game theory, the “principals”) want to know how the government is using its 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., McComber v. Traveles Property & Casualty, Case No. X03CV990496761S, Superior Ct. of 
Conn. (Jud. Distr. Of New Britain)(May 26, 2004)(unpublished disposition).
38 See J. David Cummins and Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs, 6 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 95 (1992).
39 See Kreps, supra note 32, at 763-64.
40 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 FED. REG. 32889 (Sept. 15, 1986)(subjecting numerous categories of 
federal employees to random drug tests).
41 See John T. Rourke, The GAO: An Evolving Role, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 453 (1978).
42 See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 42 (1993).
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discretion.  The problem is we have a limited budget to review decisions, and we are 
concerned about over-deterring the executive branch.  Earlier I noted that a key feature of 
judicial review is that courts and legislators tend to pick a standard of deference that’s 
supposed to apply to all cases in a particular class.  What audits do is to introduce an 
alternative means of review that allows for variation in both the standard of deference 
used to review cases as well as the number of cases actually reviewed.  In exchange for 
reviewing fewer cases, whoever is conducting the audits can demand more evidence from 
the executive branch, more justification, and more access to information – all at a lower 
cost than what would be incurred if the same standard of deference applied to every 
decision.43
The process would unfold along the following lines.  First, an auditor would 
define some discrete set of targeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all summary exclusions at 
the border, all enemy combatant designations, all discretionary – as opposed to 
mandatory – container inspections, or all decisions to freeze assets).  Second, the auditor 
would randomly choose some number or percentage of decisions to audit.  Third, those 
decisions, would be reviewed far more stringently than a court would review the whole 
class of decisions.  If a court (as with border inspection decisions) provides almost no 
review, the auditor would gather all available information about how the decision took 
place, what its effect was, what the secondary inspector knew when he denied entry, and 
what other agencies know that might be relevant to the decision.  If a court reviews 
IEEPA designations under a highly permissive version of the “arbitrary and capricious” 
and “substantial evidence” tests, the auditor would instead gather information on how an 
administrative record was complied – not just on what it purports to say.  In doing this, 
the auditor would apply some kind of standard (which I discuss below) either drawn from 
the purposes of the statutes in question, or perhaps even based on what the executive 
branch says it is trying to accomplish through its actions.  Fourth, the results of the audit 
would be made available to legislators and the public, which may (under certain 
conditions) then pressure the agency to make modifications in its conduct.  Intelligence 
information could be used in these determinations because it can be reviewed in 
camera.44  Obviously, a lot in this scenario depends on whether legislators and the public 
react to the audits.  While they might sometimes ignore those results, the media’s reaction 
to GAO and Inspector General reports suggests that these audits could be quite salient.45
Judicial review would continue in the background at whatever standard of deference 
courts and legislatures choose – though it’s certainly plausible to think that some courts 
might approach their cases differently as a result of what the audits revealed.  They might 
even evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing whether a reliable audit 
43
 While this proposal is reminiscent of Mashaw’s call for a super-agency to review benefit determinations, 
in this Part I try to offer a more detailed case for audits than has been offered before.  I also paint a picture 
of how they would work, and why judicial review as it currently functions leaves such a striking gap in our 
ability to review some kinds of executive discretionary decisions.  Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL 
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY HEARING SYSTEM (1978).
44 Cf. United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1991)(using in camera review of information obtained by 
federal agents through wiretaps authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and denying 
aggrieved party’s motion for suppression);JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993)(final chapter 
– discussing how fear of leaking is overblown).
45 See infra Part IIIa.
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system is in place.  Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every 
aggrieved person or group (that depends on how they’re designed), they would help 
legislators, organized interest groups, and the public to learn far more about what 
government does than is currently known.46
A simple model serves to demonstrate the potential differences between audits 
and traditional judicial review.  Models obviously abstract from the real world.  While 
they should be used cautiously, my aim in using on here is simply to offer a more 
concrete illustration of the critical ideas.  Begin by accepting the executive branch’s 
premise that more intrusive judicial review is a problem because it is too costly, with cost 
here referring to the whole gamut of allegedly adverse consequences associated with 
grater review stringency.  This suggests (plausibly enough) that there is a relationship 
between the stringency of judicial review and its cost.  The cost of review reflects a 
couple of things.  We should expect that the more cases reviewed, the higher is the direct 
cost incurred by the court (or some other reviewing authority) when examining cases, and 
by the executive branch when providing information and defending its actions on an 
individual case.  Moreover, the more cases reviewed (or at least eligible for review) out 
of a total pool of cases, the more that the benefits of targeted discretion might dissipate.  
Decisions may be slower (either because of the resources consumed by the review 
process, or simply because the fact they will be reviewed leads the executive branch to 
make the initial determination more judiciously).  The risk of over-deterring may also be 
greater as the proportion of cases eligible for review rises towards 100%.  On the other 
hand, more stringent judicial review is valuable because it is more likely to reveal 
problems in targeted discretionary decisions. 
A few plausible assumptions illustrate the situation.  Let the terms Cd and Ci 
denote direct and indirect costs, respectively, of reviewing cases with a particular degree 
of stringency.  Let Pr() denote the probability that a problem is discovered given a 
particular degree of stringency in the review process, which is represented by an 
increasing parameter S that begins at zero and increases to 1, which represents maximally 
intrusive review.  Let Nc denote the proportion of cases reviewed in a given class of 
cases.  Here’s how all this fits together:
• Cd and Ci increase as a linear function of S, such that C=Cd + Ci and C=f(S), such 
that one can define a two dimensional space consisting of a cost dimension C 
running vertically, and a perpendicular dimension stringency of review dimension
S running horizontally.
• For any given set of cases and stringency of review, both Cd and Ci increase as Nc
increases.  This implies that the slope of the line defining the relationship between 
S and C becomes more elastic as the proportion of cases reviewed decreases.
• Pr() increases as a linear function of S, such that one can also define a two 
dimensional space consisting of a probability of discovering problems dimension 
Pr(), and a precisely orthogonal stringency of review dimension S.
46
 Depending on the assumptions made about the political system, legislators and the public might respond 
to the audits in ways that would provide relief to all or some of the people aggrieved by problematic 
applications of targeted executive discretion.  
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• At some levels of stringency, the probability of discovering problems falls below 
an acceptable minimum (where “acceptable minimum” means the point below 
which, according to a social consensus, the probability of discovering problems 
should not fall).  There is a unique point on the S dimension (call it Smin), 
indicating the minimum acceptable degree of stringency.
• For any given Nc, there is some point Cmax representing the maximum cost of 
review that society is willing to bear in reviewing targeted discretion.  Because C
increases as a function S, Cmax corresponds to a maximum degree of stringency of 
review (call this Smax).
Figure 1 shows how these parameters interact in situations where judicial review 
is likely to work reasonably well.  Any point on the stringency axis (at the top and bottom 
of the figure) would have corresponding points, indicating the cost of that degree of 
stringency and its associated probability of discovering problems, on the two 
perpendicular axes.  The upper part of the figure shows the relationship between the costs 
of review and stringency for a given proportion of cases reviewed.  The cost-stringency 
line has roughly the same slope as the probability-stringency line in the lower figure, 
which indicates the relationship between stringency and the probability of discovering 
problems.47  The space between the lowest acceptable bound of review (Smin) and the 
highest permissible cost (which corresponds to Smax) is what I call the “feasible review 
set.”  This is the space where courts (or legislators) have some flexibility in setting the 
stringency of the doctrine.  Any level of stringency lower than Smin means there won’t be 
a high enough probability of discovering problems, and a level higher than Smax
effectively breaks the bank – either because the review process itself becomes too 
expensive or because of there is too much interference with the benefits of discretion in 
the executive branch.48
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Switch now from thinking about judicial review to thinking about audits, and a 
subtle but important difference emerges in the situation.  Because we have assumed that 
the relationship between C and S becomes more elastic as the proportion of cases 
reviewed decreases, then audits allow a higher degree of stringency of review (and 
thereby a lower standard of deference) for the same cost.  Figure 2 shows how this looks.  
In contrast with Figure 1, the slope of the cost-stringency line is now flatter than that of 
the probability-stringency line in the lower portion of the figure.49  Which means the 
feasible review set suddenly expands dramatically while the costs of review remain the 
same.  The implication is that, in exchange for lower costs by reviewing a smaller 
proportion of cases, the auditor gains the chance to review cases more thoroughly – to ask 
47
 Thus, in this first figure C=S=Pr().
48
 I’m assuming here that Smin and Smax are set exogenously, but a more complex model might derive 
these endogenously as responses to what is learned over time.  For present purposes, we might assume that 
Smax reflects some welfarist conception of a budget constraint as well as a technical judgment of how 
much executive branch discretion is desirable for a particular set of decisions.  Meanwhile, Smin might 
reflect the minimal degree of stringency necessary to force the executive branch (or one of its 
organizational units) to behave appropriately.
49
 In contrast with the previous figure, the relationship is now roughly C=3/2 S = 3/2 Pr().
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for more evidence, to require a more explicit showing of facts in a record, to inquire into 
how a particular record was developed, and ultimately, to better understand what the 
pressures may have affected the decisionmaker and distorted her decision.  What both 
Figures 1 and 2 have in common, nonetheless, is that the decisionmaker (whether a 
reviewing court or an auditor) could choose a level of stringency above Smin – or that 
level of stringency which is associated with the minimum acceptable probability of 
discovering problems.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The preceding discussion shows two differences between audits and traditional 
forms of judicial review.  With audits the costs of audits can be adjusted by changing the 
number of cases reviews, and not just the stringency of that review.  In addition, audits 
would not reflect the distortions imposed by the litigation process.  The cases reviewed 
would not be a function of who can obtain representation or what particular fact pattern 
entices judicial attention.  As I explain below, both of these characteristics turn out to be 
important in making the case for supplementing judicial review with audits of executive 
discretion.
D. Traditional  Judicial Review Suffers From Limitations
So far I have shown how audits can substitute for judicial review, but I have not 
yet addressed why it would be preferable (from what might be broadly termed a social 
welfarist perspective) to live in a world where judicial review is supplemented by audit 
review.  To understand judicial review’s merits as a way of overseeing executive 
discretion, we must review some of the costs and benefits of deviating from the 
conventional limited-discretion baseline discussed above.  With this review and the aid of 
some specific examples involving considerable degrees of executive discretion, we can 
better understand what audits can contribute.
Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and court review, any 
effort to depart from a baseline of stringent review should be continued on a satisfactory 
accounting of the benefit associated with departing from the limited-discretion baseline?  
A fairly obvious one is speed, or what is commonly termed “efficiency.”  Some decisions 
need to be made quickly if they’re going to matter.  Suppose policymakers confront a 
possible outbreak of avian flu virus.  They may consider imposing a quarantine.  They 
must decide quickly whether American airports will receive flights from the affected 
country.  To delay the decision effectively becomes a decision to let the planes land.  
Even if it is possible to wait, it may cost a lot to do so.  The Treasury can wait to freeze a 
suspicious charity’s assets, but those assets may soon leave the group’s coffers for some 
sleepless island bank secrecy haven.  Letting executive authorities have discretion lets 
them not only decide quickly – and the saved time can translate into money, extra safety, 
and convenience.  The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal 
government’s national security decisions.50  Nor is it lost on courts and scholars writing 
about other aspects of public law – such as those concerned about the “ossification” of 
regulatory rules.51  On a related note, less review also saves two kinds of resources: those 
50 See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
51 See Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking (3d ed. 1999).  See also McGarity, supra note 22, at 21-23.
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the court or other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and those that 
the government would spend defending itself.  These costs are likely to be especially 
salient because courts, relying on some version of stare decisis or horizontal equity 
norms, assume they’re fashioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar 
cases.52
Another argument for letting government have a relatively free rein in applying 
discretion is rooted in the allegedly superior technical competence of the executive 
branch.53  The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive branch have 
greater expertise than the judges who might review their decisions.  This point shows up 
time and again in judicial decisions in a wide range of domains, from environmental 
policy to police investigations.54  No doubt that expertise is valuable.  The more some 
reviewing authority intervenes, the greater the risk that expert decisions will be undone.  
More intervention may even dilute the incentives of decisionmakers to develop and use 
expertise.55
Discretion may also have a role in helping government harmonize competing 
goals, trading off some desired goals against further delays (for example) in achieving 
less compelling policy objectives.  Providing more inspectors for port security might 
require a somewhat modified inspection regime in the Northern Border to make up for 
the more limited personnel there.  If OSHA assigns some of its best inspectors to 
implement a new regulation instead of enforcing an old one, it may have to change the 
threshold for deciding to inspect a plant in order to make up for the change in the quality 
of the officials enforcing the old regulation.  Examples like these emphasize how 
discretionary decisions do not happen in a vacuum.  The president and his advisors may 
decide to devote fewer resources to freezing terrorist assets if they feel there’s been a n 
improvement in their ability to disrupt the travel plans of suspected terrorists.  Regulators 
with less resources for reviewing disclosure filings may feel the need to conduct more 
inspections.  Discretion lets executive authorities harmonize decisions in different policy 
domains.  Other things being equal, it seems plausible that greater power for courts (or 
some other reviewing authority) to intervene and undermine executive decisions would 
make it harder for the executive branch to harmonize decisions effectively.56
Finally, courts and commentators sometimes talk about the value of making the 
executive branch “accountable” for its decisions.  In an ironic twist, the rhetoric of 
accountability that so often bolsters arguments for stringent judicial review sometimes 
serves precisely the opposite goal.  The argument goes something like this.  The less that 
court (or other external) intervention encroaches on the executive’s domain, the more that 
legislators, organized interest groups and the larger public can focus on rewarding or 
52 See supra note 29.
53 See Perez v. F.B.I., 71 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1995).  But see North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 
F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002).
54 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 439 U.S. 961 (1978); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
55 Cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
56 See Greenbaum v. E.P.A., 370 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2004).
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punishing the executive (or the inferior officer) for her decisions.57  This position implies 
not only a reluctance to see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical scheme 
for accountability, but a confidence that an accounting will indeed be rendered to either 
superior officers or the public.  Thus courts observe (as did this one in declining to 
engage in review of prosecutorial discretion) that “while this discretion is subject to 
abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecutor’s] duty as an 
agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his superiors.”58
These arguments have each have a grain of truth.  What they don’t address is how 
much – and how easily – discretion can be abused, whether the context is social security 
benefit payments, border screening, enemy combatant designations, or prosecutorial 
enforcement.  Consider, for example, what could be called the “learning costs” problem.  
Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who work in them spend their days 
(ostensibly) carrying out legal mandates.  People who work there do that in part by 
relying on expertise.  They hone that expertise by learning from their environment, and 
correcting their mistakes.  But if no external authority monitors the bureaucracy, then 
those who work there may be unwilling or unable to learn much of anything.  In fact, 
several scholars have suggested that external court review helps bureaucratic institutions 
learn.  That belief is not always fully theorized – and of course court review carries with 
it the risks of over-deterring executive branch activity.59  No doubt sometimes an 
inspector’s good conscience or an agency’s strong internal culture contribute to 
reasonable decisions about what assets to freeze or who should be labeled an enemy 
combatant.  Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable 
circumstances do not always transpire, and that judicial review helps create conditions 
that foster learning.  I make this claim for two separate reasons.  First, a substantial body 
of research suggests that people learn when they have reason to do so.60  Other things 
being equal, the dilution of review may deprive individuals of reasons to learn (or, at 
least, to learn with the same intensity than they would if review were more stringent).  
This assumes, quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mistakes can be 
embarrassing to people, or that people in the agency may otherwise suffer some costs if 
they face some kind of review process that does not go well.61  Second, organizations 
develop routines that blind them.  As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the 
Challenger launch decision:
Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challenger case is how 
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational forces that 
shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes 
57 See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)(“While agencies are not directly accountable to 
the people, the Chief Executive is…”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 
(1983)(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58
 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
59
 This last point would seem to depend crucially on implicit assumptions about the extent to which the 
players involved would find it valuable to avoid having their actions vacated by a court or otherwise found 
invalid.
60 See ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (2001).
61
 This is certainly true in the case of people who work in offices whose broad performance is review by 
Inspectors General or the GAO.  See infra notes 124 and 125.
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with harmful human consequences.  The explanation of the Challenger launch is a 
story of how people who worked together developed patterns that blinded them to 
the consequences of their actions.  It is not only about the development of norms 
but about the incremental expansion of hormative boundaries: how small changes 
– new behaviors that were slight deviations from the normal course of events –
gradually became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.  
No rules were violated; there was no intent to do harm.  Yet harm was done.62
[Emphasis added].
External review may elucidate things that people inside the organization fail to 
appreciate.  Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the absence of 
expertise.  Which means that even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives 
for people to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its abundance 
may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken enemy combatant designations, 
border inspection decisions, asset freezing determinations, and health or safety 
inspections.  The larger point is that the most attractive kinds of organizational learning –
where the organization learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently – is 
likely to be rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.63 Watering down or 
forgoing judicial review altogether leaves the problem of how agencies will learn from 
their mistakes, and indeed, how agencies will even realize that they have made a 
mistake.64
Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic consequences.  
In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb to the temptation to use their 
discretion to create an appealing impression among the public.  I discuss this problem at 
greater length elsewhere,65 but the basic insight is a simple one.  Discretionary actions 
can serve as a sort of signal that the public (or political superiors) can use in forming 
judgments about the competence of the executive branch (or an organization within it).  
As long as the public’s impressions of the executive branch’s expertise, success, ability, 
and resolve are influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those actions will become 
tempting levers to create favorable public perceptions.  Frozen assets and specially-
designated terrorist organizations send the message that the executive branch knows what 
it’s doing when it may not.  This state of affairs may skew citizens’ ability to evaluate the 
62 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND 
DEVIANCE AT NASA 409-410 (1996)
63 See Michal Tamuz, Learning Disabilities for Regulators: The Perils of Organizational Learning in the 
Air Transportation Industry, 33 ADMIN. & SOC. 276 (2001); James G. March et al., Learning From 
Samples of One or Fewer, 2 ORGANIZ. SCI. 1 (1991).
64 See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note 22, for a discussion of how a regulatory agency (in that case, 
NHTSA) learned to use alternative policymaking strategies to avoid the costs associated with judicial 
review.  The example serves to emphasize two points, both of which are relevant to the present discussion: 
(a) that agencies appear to react to judicial review, and (b) that organizational learning is not necessarily 
associated with learning too achieve the most valuable organizational goals better.  Learning can be a bad 
thing; no doubt that organizations making large numbers of discretionary decisions that rarely if ever get 
reviewed (or, if reviewed, rarely get scrutinized carefully) probably learn that they can shift resources, time, 
attention, quality control, and strict adherence to legal or aspirational goals away from those decisions and 
towards other pursuits.  The question is how to encourage the most desirable kinds of learning.
65 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in 
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15 (2004).
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effectiveness of their own government.  And the discretionary actions may themselves 
have costs, including the creation of perverse incentives for regulated groups,66
diminished compliance with treaties, or simply the individual mistreatment suffered by 
individual detainees (for example) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months 
and then years before ending in freedom.  Finally, just as discretion allows political 
authorities to engage in subtle, politically-motivated self-dealing, it can also lead to some 
employees engaging in blatant, willful malfeasance.67
No one in their right mind who reflects for more than a moment on these costs 
could possibly deny that they must be weighed against discretion’s benefits.  Without 
accepting the need to balance (in principle), discussions of discretion in courts and 
scholarly circles become incoherent.  Massive discretion cannot be defended in the 
abstract because it is neither inherently good or bad.  Its consequences depend on the 
substance of the decision, its context, and the complex interplay of incentives and 
capacity affecting the decision-maker.  Should prosecutors be able to charge whomever 
they choose without looking over their shoulder?  It depends.  Should the president retain 
the power to control who’s detained as an enemy combatant or what assets, of which 
charity, get frozen?  All these powers are granted not because discretion’s inherently 
valuable but because courts and legislatures claim good things will come as a result, so 
that the costs of discretion are worth bearing.  So airport screeners keep choosing 
passengers for secondary inspection, welfare offices keep paying benefits or denying 
applications for them, and prosecutors keep choosing whether to charge a suspect.
Which brings us to the question of how to strike that balance between costs and 
benefits in the specific contexts that together constitute a messy, tangled world of 
politics, institutional pressures, economic constraints, ambitious legal mandates and 
uncertainty.  Consider some examples.
E.  Examples
i.  Freezing Financial Assets of Suspected Terrorist Supporters
Governments try to freeze the assets of groups that threaten their national 
security.  If a charity is raising funds for terrorists, the U.S. government will want to 
freeze those assets.  Doing so reduces the chance that those assets will fund the lives of 
terrorists but it also works as a sort of punishment against people or groups who should 
have known better. 
The law gives government officials some powerful tools to do this.  One of them, 
designations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or “IEEPA”),68
lets the president “block,” or freeze access to, any property subject to United States 
jurisdiction, when two conditions apply.  First, the property in question must be 
66 See id.
67 See THE ABU GHARIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL AND 
PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (2005).
68
 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq (“IEEPA”).  See generally 
James J. Savage, Executive Use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act – Evolution Through 
the Terrorist and Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 28 (2001).
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something in which a foreign country or national has an interest.69  This constraint turns 
out to be not much of a limitation on the president’s power, since courts have found that 
the “foreign” interest does not have to be a legal interest of any kind.  The mere fact that 
an organization has foreign beneficiaries may be enough, in fact, for a court to say that it 
has a “foreign interest.”70 Second, the president must use this power only during an 
emergency.71  That’s not much of a limitation, either.  The emergency must involve an 
“unusual and extraordinary threat” giving rise to the emergency must have its source 
partly outside the United States.72  It might pose a threat to the “national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States.”73  The combined effect of this expansive 
language and traditional judicial deference on matters of national security and foreign 
affairs have made it relatively easy for presidents to declare a number of emergencies 
(about ten of which are currently in effect).74  Courts have yet to find that, under the 
terms of IEEPA, a supposed emergency does not, in fact, exist.
In a series of executive orders, the President’s delegated authority under IEEPA to 
the Secretaries of State and Treasury.  Under the resulting system, the Treasury’s Office 
of Foreign Asset Control blocks the assets of groups that branded “Specially Designated 
Terrorist Organizations.”75  Once a group becomes a specially designated terrorist 
organization, it loses control over its fate.  As a lawyer for a designated group recently 
wrote, the organization is likely to shut down and lay off its employees:
Acting under the blocking notice, government agents entered HLF's offices in 
Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, and California, seized and removed the contents 
(including everything from documents to office equipment to employees' personal 
effects), and froze HLF's bank accounts, which contained millions of dollars in 
charitable contributions. As of that day, HLF ceased operations. Its employees 
lost their jobs.76
The impact of OFAC’s orders is to block the organization’s funds, regardless of where in 
the financial system they happen to be.  The designation also means that people providing 
“material support” to the group commit a serious federal crime.77
Take a closer look at how the court reviews the government’s designations. In the 
recent Holy Land Foundation case, the State and Treasury departments used IEEPA 
powers delegated to them by the president.78  Agency staff issued a blocking order.  The 
blockage limits what the charity can do.  Its powers and options are drastically 
constrained as a result of the blocking order. When the court considers whether a 
69 Id.
70 See Global Relief Fdn. V. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
71 See IEEPA, supra note 68.
72 See Holy Land Fdn. V. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
73 Id.
74 See generally Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (2000).
75
 333 F.3d at 160.
76 See John D. Cline, The President’s Power to Seize Property in the Post-September 11 World: The 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, CHAMPION (Sept/Oct. 2003).
77 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
78
 333 F.3d at 159-60.
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designation was legal, it defines a certain standard of review to circumscribe its inquiry.  
Specifically, it considers whether the decision is “arbitrary and capricious” under the 
terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.  But it interprets IEEPA and the national 
security context in which these decisions take place to require a highly deferential form 
of review.  Now the District Court took that standard and seemed to push it about as far 
as it would go.  The key factual question, the District Court and the litigants agreed, was 
the extent of HLF’s connection to Hamas, another specially designated terrorist 
organization (and one that, at least at this point, few people had reason to doubt as a 
“terrorist organization”).  The district court conducted a careful examination of the record 
and uncovered “ample” evidence that:
(1) HLF has had financial connects to Hamas since its creation in 1989; (2) HLF 
leaders have been actively involved in various meetings with Hamas leaders; (3) 
HLF funds Hamas-controlled charitable organizations; (4) HLF provides financial 
support to the orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF’s 
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants reliably 
reported that HLF funds Hamas.79
This kind of review might strike some observers as particularly thorough.  That 
perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons.  First, the court considers only whether 
the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” and based on “substantial evidence,” not 
whether it was right or wrong.  That determination, moreover, reflects a statutory text 
(the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court’s inquiry extremely deferential 
and perhaps helps explain why so few of these determinations get challenged in court 
(because it’s not clear what will be gained).  Second, as a practical matter, the court’s 
inquiry (even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the envelope in terms of 
the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record that the government itself 
compiles.  As the district court itself noted in this case, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard “does not allow the courts to undertake their own fact-finding, but to review the 
agency’s record to determine whether the agency’s decision was supported by a rational 
basis.”80  That record may be a tremendously accurate complication of the government’s 
evidence. Or it may be patently misleading.  Nothing requires that the government report 
evidence tending to cast doubt on its contentions.81  Nor does the court interview the 
sources on which the record is based.  Which means that, even in the best of 
circumstances, the court’s review is only as good as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review is likely to exert only a limited 
impact on the quality of that record.  If that record turns out to be an empty folder, then 
the court would almost certainly vacate the designation without ever getting to the 
arbitrary and capricious test, because of the absence of “substantial evidence.”  On the 
other hand, officials who want to evade that possibility need only make sure there is a 
thick enough record to make it hard for the court to conclude that such a record makes the 
79
 333 F.3d at 161.
80 See Holy Land, 219 F.Supp.2d at 67.
81
 Ironically enough, the Holy Land appeals panel suggested that the government’s position was 
strengthened by the fact that “there was no plausible evidence presented which showed that [ties to Hamas] 
had been severed.” 333 F.3d at 162.
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designation look totally arbitrary.  The thing is, the record itself is based on decisions that 
are essentially immune from review.  Which makes them prone to the familiar political 
pressures and distortions that permeate government bureaucracy.82
ii.  Government-Run “No Fly” Lists
When passengers check in at American airports, their names are compared to 
those on a list provided to airlines by the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA).83  Predictably enough, the point of the list is to thwart the (travel) plans of those 
who might prove dangerous on board a flight.  A subsidiary purpose may also be to 
promote the questioning and apprehension of suspicious individuals who may be sought 
by law enforcement authorities.  Although the aforementioned list (technically an element 
of a system known as CAPPS I) is considered by TSA to be an important component of 
aviation security, recent efforts have focused on supplementing it with a more elaborate 
safeguard.84  The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new system, 
since shortly after September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays.85  The 
advent of the new system, however, is unlikely to lead to the complete demise of some 
version of the current process, as the government will likely retain a “core” list of people 
who should be detained when they attempt to travel.86
In practice, TSA and the airlines have run into problems using the list.  It is not 
applied consistently.  Sometimes people whose names are merely similar to those on the 
list are detained.  It appears as though even individuals who are actually named on the list 
are virtually never completely denied the chance to fly; they are instead detained, at times 
forced to miss their flight, and subjected to extensive questioning.  Even supposing 
assuming some of the problems with the list’s use could be remedied, it would seem as 
though there should be some procedure to police the list, so that people who are 
erroneously placed there could be taken off.  
Nothing of the sort exists.87  Instead, people who plainly should not be on the list 
(including, for example, a member of the Air Force reporting for duty) are bewildered to 
learn that they cannot even find out how their name appeared on the list, let alone what 
82
 Note that I am not suggesting that the manipulation of the record need be conscious or explicit.  A 
number of pressures and considerable number of investigators, analysts, spies, lawyers, and higher level 
officials whose work influences the record that the court reviews.  As long as they feel at least some subtle 
pressure to support the conclusion that a designation should be made, they may fail to consider 
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standard, or the executive branch’s stated goals for using the IEEPA emergency powers)].
83 See Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO 04-385 (Feb. 2004)(“GAO Report”).
84 See generally Green v. TSA, 351 F.Supp.2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
85 See GAO Report, supra  note 83, at 9.  For developments since February 2004, see Government 
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86 See EPIC v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2005 WL 1745303 (July 25, 2005).
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must be done to remove it.88  TSA may be understandably reluctant to reveal the quality 
of its methods and sources, either because it seeks to avoid sensitizing potential terrorists 
to the extent of their strengths or alerting the larger public to the extent of their 
weaknesses.  But that still leaves the question of how the quality of the list will be 
policed.  The question becomes more pressing given the apparent absence of any reliable, 
consistent review mechanism to ensure the names on the list belong there.89  Reasonable 
people can differ with respect to how much discretion TSA should have in deciding what 
information to evaluate when deciding whether to place someone on the list, and whether 
(on the basis of that information) a name belongs there.  What’s harder to dispute is the 
absence of any statutory provision for administrative or judicial mechanisms to resolve 
the problem.  This leaves aggrieved parties with the option of a lawsuit claiming that their 
treatment as a result of being placed on the list amounts to a due process violation.  Such 
a lawsuit is currently pending.  But regardless of the outcome, the no-fly list problem 
illustrates why due process claims may be a poor vehicle for policing this type of 
discretion.  Assuming the litigants persuade a court that the problems they confront while 
flying amount to an interference with a protected liberty or (less likely) property interest, 
they would still have to persuade a court that existing procedures violate the interest-
balancing test rooted in Mathews v. Eldrige.90  That would be a tough sell given the 
strength of the interest the government would assert in promoting aviation security.  
Which leaves the quality of the list dependent on the bureacracy’s behavior.  
iii.  Launching Major Occupational and Environmental Safety Inspections
In criminal justice, people and organizations tend to face severe penalties only 
after they’re convicted or admit their guilt.  When legislators approve statutes creating 
major regulatory programs, they often build in a different mechanism.  Implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly), their enactments recognize that using the criminal justice system to 
punish violations is cumbersome.  Instead, many laws allow regulators to levy fines or 
issue orders restricting certain activities with more limited (if any) court intervention.  
Although they vary in the relevant legal standard or the size of the maximum fine, those 
orders have an effect before judicial intervention.  Even after that intervention, it’s not at 
all clear how well the stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to 
some varation of the “arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse of discretion” standards) strikes 
the most desirable balance between restraining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
Consider two examples.  When the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) has some reason to think businesses are violating their general 
duty to provide a safe working environment, it can issue abatement orders and citations.91
Parties who fail to abate as the agency requires face additional penalties, as do those who 
88
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89 See GAO Report, supra note 83, at 13.
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engage in “serious” or willful” violations (even before an abatement order is issued).92
Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is expensive, which 
means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines OSHA tends to assess instead of 
contesting them.  Penalties for violating compliance orders are considerably more severe 
under environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.93  Under that statute, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative Compliance Order 
(ACO) on the basis of “any information available to it,” directing a regulated party – such 
as an electricity generation plant – or state agency to comply with the Clean Air Act’s 
requirements.  While the ACO doesn’t allow EPA to impose finds or other penalties 
directly, the order triggers provisions imposing civil or criminal penalties for violation of 
the order.94  Under the terms of the Act, it initially appeared as though judicial review of 
an ACO was supposed to focus on whether the regulated party violated the terms of the 
order, not whether the EPA was right to issue it in the first place.95  This has 
understandably raised questions about how the order itself should be reviewed.  In recent 
cases, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have left some uncertainty about 
whether the ACO structure withstands constitutional scrutiny given its due process 
implications.  At least one circuit court found ACOs not to be final agency actions (which 
is required for circuit court review in these cases), thereby rendering them unreviewable 
and raising the due process problem.96  The Supreme Court declined to review this case, 
and instead – in a separate case – upheld a Ninth Circuit opinion holding ACOs to be 
final agency actions and reviewing them under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.97
In both cases, the relevant agencies retain considerable discretion in imposing 
compliance orders.  OSHA obviously has it when it issues citations and abatement orders, 
some of which are not challenged subsequently.  The environmental orders must survive 
arbitrary and capricious review if challenged (in circuits that didn’t find the whole 
structure unconstitutional), but that leaves the agency the power to compel behavior in 
the absence of a challenge, and even if arbitrary and capricious review is not as 
deferential in this context is it is with asset freezes (because of the national security 
dimension of those cases), it still leaves the court applying a fairly deferential standard of 
review to a decision that can be based on “any available information.”  It’s quite plausible 
that the extent of resulting stringency in review is a reasonable compromise if the 
standard is going to be applied across the board, to every compliance order.  It’s also 
quite possible that such review will not say much about the quality of compliance order 
decisions, which could (or perhaps should) ultimately affect the extent of confidence in 
the regulatory structures.  Put differently, better review of regulatory decisions to impose 
compliance orders could change the bundle of substantive powers and penalties that 
could be acceptable to an enacting legislative and interest group coalition.
92 See id.
93 Clean Air Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and (c)(2000).  For a detailed discussion, see generally Jason D. Nichols, 
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95 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).
96 See TVA v. Whitman, 226 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
97 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation V. EPA, 53 U.S. 1186 (2003); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2002).
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F.  Audits Can Ameliorate the Limitations of Traditional Judicial Review.
The preceding examples hint at a basic problem with managing executive 
discretion: unfortunately, sometimes judicial review is bound to fail when it comes to 
striking a balance between the aforementioned costs and benefits in the preceding 
domains.  Figure 3 indicates the problem.  What if a reasonable amount of review is 
simultaneously prohibitively expensive and extremely valuable?  Imagine, for example, a 
situation where the cost-stringency function actually looks quite different from the 
probability-stringency function.  Suppose, for example, that the first function is basically 
a linear one, just as in Figures 1 and 2.  Stringency pushes up the cost of review in a 
linear fashion.  But (as the lower portions of Figure 3 indicate) imagine that the 
relationship between stringency of review and the probability of discovering problems is 
starkly discontinuous.  That is – a substantial increase in the stringency of review yields a 
very small appreciable benefit in terms of Pr (), even though the cost is still increasing 
in a linear fashion as the stringency does.  Then suddenly there is a substantial increase.  
This sort of relationship might describe situations where most of the problems affecting 
targeted discretionary decisions involve complicated willful malfeasance rather than 
simple mistakes.  The decisionmakers might engage in a concerted effort to cover up 
their tracks – which could only be detected with an extraordinarily thorough 
investigation.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Now put this together with a relatively low maximum acceptable cost (Smax), 
which is what the court may set if the decision has to do with national security.  And 
notice what this does to the feasible review set.  Essentially, it disappears.  This implies 
that at least in some instances where targeted discretion is used, there may be no feasible 
review set, because the cost of reviewing discretionary decisions at the level of stringency 
necessary to actually have a credible chance of detecting problems far exceeds the 
maximum socially-acceptable cost of review.
Things look a little different if we use audits instead of traditional judicial review.  
The right side of Figure 3 tells the story.  As with Figure 2, the slope of the cost-
stringency line is flatter (more elastic), which leads to a higher stringency of review for 
any given cost that is paid for review.  The result creates a small feasible review set –
enough room for the auditor to avoid exceeding the maximum cost yet still have a quite 
reasonable opportunity to detect problems afflicting discretionary decisions.  
When it comes to detecting those problems, audits hold another advantage over 
traditional judicial review.  By its nature, litigation produces a biased sample.  The cases 
we learn about are the ones that get litigated, and under various plausible conditions those 
cases are not the only ones likely to involve valid claims.98  As Bill Simon’s pointed out 
in the welfare context, for example, this pattern can seriously distort our understanding of 
a policy’s strengths and weaknesses.  It can also lead to court decisions may privilege 
98
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existing claimants over potential ones.99  This doesn’t mean that litigation and judicial 
review are not valuable in other ways.  They can vindicate the interests of people who are 
legally and morally entitled to a proverbial “day,” in court, or to a set of special remedies 
for which litigation is the best rationing device.  Litigation harnesses the intricate 
machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to articulate and clarify legal norms in the context 
of specific cases.  Rulemaking could let agencies “move from vague or absent statutory 
standards to reasonably definite standards, and then, as experience and understanding 
develop, to guiding principles, and finally, when the subject matter permits, to precise 
and detailed rules.”100  But these modes of inquiry are like discretion itself: replete with 
strengths and weaknesses.  They should be treated accordingly and supplemented with 
audits.101
Notice that getting these benefits depends on making at least a few assumptions 
about the powers of the “auditor,” though I suspect they are not entirely implausible.  
Specifically, the auditor needs to be in a better position to discover problems in the use of 
targeted discretion than the bureaucracy being reviewed.  This probably means three 
things:  (a) that the auditor is motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate 
them), thereby avoiding some of the willful malfeasance and politically-oriented self-
dealing problems that bureaucracies have because of their political context; (b) that the 
auditor has sufficient abilities to evaluate the discretionary decision, perhaps in part 
through reference to some explicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such 
decisions; and (c) that the auditor is at least somewhat better than the decisionmakers
being reviewed at avoiding some of the more subtle mistakes that afflict discretionary 
decisionmaking.  Tempting as it may be to collapse these conditions into an “expertise” 
parameter, it’s important to recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more 
ambiguous term than is often recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet potentially quite 
dangerous two-edged sword: what makes some bureaucratic decisionmakers blind to the 
complexities of the problems they face is precisely their expertise in defining those 
problems in a standard, predictable fashion that often turns out to be wrong.102  Obviously 
the auditor(s) must know something of what it means to correctly freeze assets or assess 
regulatory penalties, but it’s not obvious if that implies the sort of familiarity that allows 
a generalist judge to handle, say, criminal and complex tort cases, or whether it’s more 
akin to the kind of specialization one already observers in the GAO and IG offices.103
Whether it’s possible to generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on 
how to resolve questions about the details of the institutional design, to which I turn 
below.
99 See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.  REV. 1431 (1986).
100
 Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 219.
101 See infra Part II.b.
102 See, e.g., Vaughan, supra note 62, at 62 (“[T]he consequence of professional training and experience is 
itself a particularlistic world-view comprising certain assumptions, expectations, and experiences that 
become integrated with the person’s sense of the world.”).  See also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL 
ACCIDENTS (1984); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY (1995).
103
 And obviously, whatever the benefits of specialization (which help establish the presence of condition 
“b” above), they need to be balanced against the risk of sacrificing condition “c.”
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II.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS ARE TRACTABLE
A.  Audits Can Be Adapted to Address Multiple Forms of Discretion
The preceding examples and discussion suggest that a certain kind of discretion, 
which could be called “targeted discretion,” may be especially (though by no means 
uniquely) suited to audits.  This is the kind of discretion showcased in the preceding 
examples.  As Kenneth Culp Davis recognized a generation ago, the government is 
replete with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where “the usual 
quality of justice” may be quite low.104  Such discretion, showcased in the preceding 
examples, primarily involves specific, targeted decisions whose primary effect is on 
specific individuals and groups.105  Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying 
some implicit or explicit legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy 
basis (i.e., “enemy combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them linked to Al-
Qaeda”) that the executive branch itself has articulated as a rationale for these 
decisions.106  Targeted discretion stands in contrast to broader policy judgments.  Those 
judgments involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant policy 
considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a regulatory rule or the content 
of an executive order.
Obviously, some policy judgments are designed precisely to affect targeted 
discretion.  The Social Security Administration promulgates standards governing benefit 
payments, thereby making a policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion.  
When government freezes allegedly terrorist assets, the State and Treasury Departments 
implement statutory standards from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA), as interpreted through policy judgments in the president’s executive orders.  
But despite their overlapping contours, these different sorts of discretion should 
nonetheless be distinguished.  Though others may disagree, it seems as though policy 
judgments call for a different kind of review compared to targeted discretionary decisions 
that so often involve applying rules or standards to a particular set of facts.  Whatever the 
arguments for deferring to the executive branch when an agency writes a rule or a 
president signs an executive order, those arguments seem at least somewhat weaker when 
the executive branch claims to be applying a standard to the facts.  In the latter case the 
implicit claim is: “we may have to apply some judgment, but when we detain someone as 
an enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an industrial plant, there’s no question 
about the purpose we are serving.  We’re enforcing the law.”  
No doubt sometimes government officials will argue that the details of a policy 
judgment – like precisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen –
104
 Culp Davis, supra note 1, at 216.
105
 Targeted discretion bears some resemblance to the concept of “informal adjudication” long discussed by 
administrative law scholars.  For a brief discussion of the definitions associated with “informal 
adjudication” and some of the doctrinal problems implicit in this category of administrative action, see
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on 
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057 (2004).
106 See Brief for Respondent, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 7, at 12. 
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should not be made entirely public.107  They might also argue that standards reflecting 
policy judgments should develop organically in response to experience (what would 
Diane Vaughan say to that?), instead of being fixed ahead of time.  Even if one finds 
these positions attractive on the surface, it seems easier to think about them if we accept 
at least some distinction between government decisions that fix a standard that is 
supposed to apply across cases and those decisions that apply standards (or even quite 
general values) to specific cases.  Though some may even insist that certain discretionary 
decisions involving national security (for example) are entirely immune from any 
standard,108 this seems hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent imperative: that 
government decisions should not be arbitrary.
Audits of executive discretion may be viable even outside domains where their 
utility is most readily observable.  As I note in Part IV, it may be possible to modify 
audits to shed light on applications of discretion drawn from a sparse set of decisions, or 
on policy discretion exercised in the course of rulemaking, for example, may nonetheless 
still be suitable for some kind of modified audit.109  Another complication is epitomized 
by cases like Webster, where existing law fails to define a standard against which conduct 
can be assessed.110  Obviously, there would not be much discretion to audit if the domain 
were restricted to instances where a clear legal standard already existed.  Ironically, in 
many circumstances where statutes are exceedingly vague – as with the Sherman 
Antitrust Act – a standard nonetheless emerges from the process judicial review itself.  
The absence that in some contexts is precisely what makes audits desirable.  In the 
section that follows I discuss how such a standard might be derived by the auditor from 
overt executive—branch assertions or through reasonable interpretations of related 
constitutional, statutory, and policy principles.
B. Most  Institutional Design Problems Have Plausible Solutions
Lurking just beneath the surface are practical questions of institutional design.  
My goal here is mostly to acknowledge those questions and begin thinking about how 
they might be solved.  Resolving them completely would take some considerable 
attention to the particular kind of targeted discretionary decision that needs to be 
107 See Doherty v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 775 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985).
108
 The contention may be that, in addition to being free of any sort of formal review, certain national 
security decisions – like a presidential choice to bomb a potentially threatening target in the Sudan – should
not conform to any standard at all.  This position seems to confound the question of whether we should 
avoid setting a standard because it’s too difficult to monitor it, or whether in an ideal world the president 
should never rely on a standard at all.  The former is easier to justify than the latter.
109 Small samples are not a fatal problem when Bayesian techniques are applied and the analysis is 
accompanied by appropriate assumptions.  See, e.g., March, supra note 63; M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, 
Organizational Aspects of Engineering System Safety: The Case of Offshore Platforms, 250 SCIENCE 1210 
(1990).  Regarding policy discretion: although policy discretion arguably raises different problems, it may 
also be worth scrutinizing, case-by-case, the basis for application of an overtly stated policy; for example, 
how specific permissible exposure limits get set when courts allow rules that fix multiple standards – which 
they now discourage, though audits might be a promising alternative to simply banning such rules; 
instances of information dissemination and use regulatory agencies (as an alternative to the potentially 
cumbersome data quality act rules).
110 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 602-04. 
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reviewed, and to the political and institutional context affecting the agency (or agencies) 
making those decisions.  
One question, for example, is how many decisions should be reviewed.  The short 
answer is it depends on the total costs that can be incurred during the review process 
(both in terms of direct costs and in terms of the cost of limiting discretion).  In keeping 
with the assumption that review increases as a function of the number of cases reviewed, 
the lower the “budget” for reviewing, the smaller the number of cases that can be 
reviewed.  But if the budget is flexible, then how many cases would be “enough”?  Think 
about this problem by envisioning two different kinds of situations that might arise.  
Sometimes there may be thousands, or tens of thousands, of targeted discretionary 
decisions to audit – as with border screening decisions or container inspections.  In those 
situations, we might apply some of the counter-intuitive insights from probability theory.  
Those theories suggest that the accuracy of inferences drawn from analyzing a sample of 
cases depends on the number of cases sampled, and not necessarily on the total 
proportion of cases drawn from a population.111  A sample of 500 cases, for example, 
might be associated with a confidence interval of plus or minus 6%, and one of a 
thousand cases drives the range down to about plus or minus 3%.  The number of cases 
audited from a large number of cases would then depend at least partly on the desired 
confidence interval.  But other factors would also matter.  The more it is important to 
constrain perceived executive abuses, the greater the number of cases that should be 
audited.  One might even envision a sliding scale, where the proportion of cases audited 
grows in response to the results of earlier audits with a smaller number of cases.  All of 
these considerations then need to be weighed against the two kinds of costs (direct and 
indirect) that review implies.
What if we’re dealing with domains with smaller numbers of cases (say, a 
population of less than 1000 cases, as with Specially-Designated Terrorist 
Organizations)?  Here, cost constraints could so limit the number of audited cases that it 
would not be realistic to expect very reliable confidence intervals.  Nonetheless, audits 
would still serve the useful purpose of constraining executive authorities, who would 
know that some proportion (ranging, initially, between 10 and 20 percent depending on 
cost) of their decisions would be carefully scrutinized to make sure they’re done 
effectively.112
In both cases, one important question is whether the number of cases would 
include both instances where targeted discretion resulted in some sanction or cost being 
imposed (creating the potential for so-called Type I errors), as well as those instances 
where it was not imposed (Type II errors).  For example, should someone audit just those 
cases where a charity was labeled a Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations, or also 
those where sanctions were not imposed?  It’s quite likely that we would learn a good 
deal from including the cases where powers were not used.  But this would raise two 
111 See A.I. Dale, On a Problem in Conditional Probability, 41 PHIL. OF SCIENCE 204 (1974).
112 See supra note 110.  Moreover, it may be possible to deal with domains involving extremely low 
numerosity by creating a reliable system to randomize the probability that a decision will be reviewed at all 
(or, to put it differently, by lumping together several classes of related, low-numerosity decisions and then 
auditing some proportion of them).
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problems that need to be resolved later.  First is deciding whether the expanded 
population of cases should include the whole universe (i.e., every charity, or – say –
every charity operating in the Middle East) or just “near misses” (charities that attracted 
the attention of State, Treasury, the CIA, or the NSC but, perhaps because of political 
considerations, were not specially-designated).  The former is more accurate but would so 
quickly consume auditing resources that it may not be feasible.  The latter is simpler but 
less accurate.  The second problem is overcoming the likely political resistance (from the 
executive branch, who would already have reason to resist audits) that comes from 
expanding the scope of review even further.  This is a more general problem to which I 
return below.
Another recurring question is who exactly would do the audits.  Some observers 
may insist that courts may lack the inclination, legal authority, culture, or expertise 
necessary to engage directly in audits, though they could probably appoint masters to do 
some of this work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the 
existence of reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for audits as a remedy 
in the (unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals bureaucratic failures.113  By rewarding 
bureaucracies with reliable audit structures, courts could advance two interrelated 
objectives.  They could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality of 
discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially-relevant standard of quality 
encompassing, for example, reductions in the probability of obvious mistakes), and they 
would be creating the conditions for enriching the in formation on the basis of which a 
court can resolve specific cases.  To the extent that courts run into Vermont Yankee 
problems,114 legislators could create an article I court with a distinctive mission and 
resources to build specialized capacity – or an entirely separate bureaucracy.  Among 
existing agencies, the GAO and IG Offices are best positioned to do this sort of work 
(though, as I note below, they have largely avoided doing so).  In short, a combination of 
judicial and legislative innovation could lower barriers preventing Article III courts from 
more easily encouraging audits, which could also be performed by existing federal audit 
bureaucracies.  I discuss the political challenges to these scenarios in Part IV.  
Whatever the institutional structure, the auditor (let’s use that term for now) 
would probably need the power to compel production of evidence and testimony, along 
with a cadre of independently-funded investigators.  Otherwise it would be hard for the 
auditor to delve into enemy combatant designations or container inspections more 
aggressively than a court could.  Sensitive information could be reviewed in-camera 
(something that would further weaken the argument that review is impossible because the 
information involved is too sensitive.115  Because this problem has been so often 
113
 They would have to do this in a way that avoids running afoul of the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee 
decision.  See Vermont Yankee, 439 U.S. at 961.
114 Id.
115
 We already let judges sometimes handle sensitive information and use it to make decisions in cases.  See
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  It’s hard to see why audits of targeted discretion should be avoid on 
the grounds that the underlying discretionary decision depends on sensitive information.  If the argument is 
that it’s dangerous or problematic to share the results of audits of targeted discretion because the policy 
domain requires complete secrecy even of the quality of decisions being made – then that argument should 
be advanced on its own merits and it should have to overcome a high barrier.  See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to audits relying on it is a red herring.  
Recent history is full of examples where this problem has been solved.116  In addition to 
courts reviewing the information in camera, high profile commissions like the 9/11 
Commission and expert working groups routinely get security clearances and access to 
classified information.117  The resulting, publicly disclosed work product either omits 
classified information or provides some redacted summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or not, what 
standard would the auditor use to evaluate it?  Ideally the statutes or constitutional 
provisions implicated in the discretionary decisions would provide some standard for the 
auditor to use, even when the standard is too vague for courts to apply.  Or the auditing 
authority can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doctrines together 
could be taken to imply conditions on the use of discretionary powers.118  The auditor 
could even use statements from the executive branch itself to see whether the audited 
cases seem to be consistent with those statements.119  In some circumstances, where the 
executive refuses to articulate an explicit standard to fill in gaps left by executive, 
legislative, or judicial silence, the auditor itself could articulate a reasonable standard 
(which is, by the way, what the GAO and IG do in related context, when they audit 
“broad management practices”).  The standard might reflect insights drawn from 
constitutional interpretation, policy considerations, or even statutes’ legislative history. 
A final issue is what to do with the results of the audits.  The question turns on 
whether audits are expected to provide an independent remedy for aggrieved individuals 
and groups – like a court proceeding would – or whether they are simply expected to 
inform the judgments of legislators and the larger public.  One possibility is to announce 
the results of the audits (minus the sensitive information).  What this would accomplish 
116 See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (DC Cir. 2004).
117 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004).
118
 Deriving such “implicit” standards is exactly what the Supreme Court has discouraged in cases like 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  There the Court held that agency decisions not to use their 
enforcement powers are almost always “committed to agency discretion” under the terms of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (2000).  The exception is where a statute provides 
“clear guidelines” that a court could use as a standard against which to judge agency decisions.  Indeed, 
when no such standard is apparent on the face of the statute, then courts tend to find that the absence of 
such a standard overcomes what is otherwise a presumption of reviewability.  See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 
U.S. 182 (1993).  What these cases sometimes gloss over (but seem to recognize far more explicitly in 
cases involving the nondelegation doctrine) is the extent to which the existence of standards is on a 
continuum, where virtually any government action or inaction (including decisions not to prosecute) could 
be evaluated in accordance with some defensible criterion. For an exception, see Adams v. Richardson, 480 
F.2d 1159 (DC Cir. 1973)(agency has "consciously and expressly adopted a general policy" that is so 
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibility).  This is not to suggest that courts 
should be the primarily actors in conducting targeted discretion audits (perhaps some independent auditing 
authority including a mixture of judges and non-judges would have more flexibility to articulate standards).  
It is, rather, to point out that courts’ reluctance to articulate standards when they find them missing on the 
face of a statute should not be taken as an indication that such an enterprise is fruitless.
119
 For example, if statutes say that the CIA Director can fire someone for being a national security risk and 
let him define what that means, then the audit could review the definition with particular care to see if it’s 
plausible – and announce the results.  Or it could rely on agency definitions of “national security” in related 
contexts.  Cf. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 836 (suggesting that an agency decision not to enforce could be 
challenged if the agency itself has committed to act in specified circumstances).
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depends on the reactions of legislators and the mass public, which can vary depending on 
the circumstances.120  Another possibility is to give relief (or impose belated sanctions) 
whenever audits reveal problematic cases.  A woman improperly barred from entering the 
country could be allowed to return.  Assets that should not have been frozen could be 
unblocked.  Enemy combatants could be set free.  This is certainly a principled position, 
though it obviously raises certain costs associated with the audits.121  A third approach is 
for the results of audits to trigger additional procedural standards, such as review of more 
decisions and (perhaps) greater judicial scrutiny.  The choice among these alternatives is 
likely to depend heavily on some of the political considerations I discuss in Part III.  
What’s important is to think of the choice not only in terms of what benefits could be 
provided to aggrieved individuals, but also (more generally) how different remedial 
schemes are likely to impact agencies’ willingness to learn from their mistakes and 
structure its work to avoid future abuses.  In short, through careful institutional 
engineering, analogies to existing, institutions, and some experimentation, most of the 
“problems” identified can be solved.  We might then ask whether they have been solved 
already.
III.
REFORMS CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH THE STATUS QUO
The value of supplementing judicial review with audits of executive discretion 
depends largely on whether or not something like these audits already occurs.  Audits of 
targeted discretion may sound like exactly the sort of work that the GAO and the IG 
Offices already do.  These audit bureaucracies were, after all, created to audit the 
government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include investigating the management 
of government programs.122  Their activities are sometimes directed by legislators, who 
(in turn) can proceed with their own audits.  Do they?
A.   Federal Bureaucracies Do Not Ordinarily Perform Audits
For the audit bureaucracies the answer is basically “no.”  These agencies do a 
tremendous amount of interesting (and probably sometimes quite valuable work) on 
bureaucratic performance.  The scope of their authority is quite broad.  The GAO, for 
example, has the power to examine “any matter” relating in some way to the 
disbursement of public money.123  The Inspector General offices in federal departments 
have a similarly broad mandate.124  Yet they rarely seem to do rigorous audits of targeted 
executive discretion.  
120 See Asher Arian, Political and Economic Interactions with National Security Opinion: The Gulf War 
Period in Israel, 43 J. CONFLICT RES. 58 (1999); David O. Sears et al., Political System Support and Public 
Response to the Energy Crisis, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 56 (1978).
121
 Although I do not develop the argument here, one might imagine a situation where the designers of the 
audit system would trade-off the ability to grant relief in exchange for the political and economic resources 
to audit more cases or to do so more intensely.  That’s the sort of bargain that supporters of “truth 
commissions” are willing to make.
122 See infra notes 124, 125, and 142.
123
 31 U.S.C. § 712 (1).
124 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101  (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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There is some literature on the historical origin, legal jurisdiction, organization, 
and culture of these audit bureaucracies.  But we know relatively little about what the 
reports of these audit bureaucracies are about, what methods they use to develop their 
analyses, whether these reports contain recommendations that agencies actually 
implement, and whether any of this gets media attention.  These questions are obviously 
relevant here because they affect whether there is a deficit of the kinds of audits I 
recommend, and their answers help us learn something about how audit bureaucracies 
might go about doing more of what I recommend.  To begin engaging some of these 
questions, I can present some initial results from a more extensive ongoing study of the 
audit bureaucracies.  The data were obtained primarily from the GAO and IG Offices 
websites, or (in some cases) directly from the GAO.  Four trained research assistants have 
worked with me to code many of these reports and gather additional data about key 
agencies.  Among other things, our goal has been to see how frequently the GAO and IG 
Offices do targeted discretion audits of the kind I recommend above.  The results, shown 
on Figure 4, indicate how rare this is.  The figure divides reports on the basis of whether 
they do something like a targeted discretion audit.  Only a small number of reports appear 
to do anything even remotely resembling an audit of executive discretion, and even 
among those reports the focus is only on a small subset of the discretionary authority.  
Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in administrative systems like those 
governing aviation security.  But audits of discretion are altogether missing for a number 
of categories of decisions, including “no fly” lists, enemy combatant designations, 
individuals removed at the border and not allowed to apply for asylum, and 
administrative compliance orders from agencies like OSHA.  For instance, the GAO’s 
otherwise thorough report on the Transportation Security Agency’s computerized 
aviation security system shows how carefully the agency reviewed the architecture of the 
computer algorithm and the management practices associated with the systems.  It did 
not, however, pick a subset of names to inquire exhaustively how they ended up on the 
list or what evidence supported that determination.125
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
My preliminary data on the GAO and IG Offices also lets me anticipate and offer 
a partial response to two skeptical views about the idea of audits.  First, would anyone in 
the public actually care about the results of the audits?  After all, much of the idea is 
predicated on the notion that there may be political consequences to revealing how 
discretion is being used.  This is particularly important if the scheme is not designed to 
deliver a direct remedy to people affected by the reviewed cases.  Second, wouldn’t 
agencies simply ignore the results of the audits?  If they did, then the promised learning 
bonus from audits would be unlikely to materialize.
Even at this early point in the empirical phase of the project, it appears as though 
GAO and IG Office reports get a considerable amount of attention in the print and 
television media.  The following figure shows the number of stories in the New York 
Times and in transcripts of television news stories between January 2002 and January 
2005 mentioning the GAO or IG Offices.  Figure 5a shows the number of New York 
Times articles mentioning the audit bureaucracies.  Nearly a thousand do.  A random
125 See GAO Report, supra note 83.
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sample of 200 of those news stories indicates that, while only about 3% of the stories 
involving the GAO appear on page 1, about 10% of those mentioning the IG Offices do 
so.  Audit bureaucracies are also discussed on broadcast news and cable channels.  Even 
in these media, nearly a hundred news segments mention the various IG Offices, and 
about 30 mention the GAO.126
[FIGURES 5]
What about recommendations from auditors being ignored?  I have obtained data 
on all the 10,000 or so recommendations made by the GAO over the last 15 years.  After 
the GAO makes recommendations to an agency in its reports, what it does is to follow up 
through interviews, additional investigation, document reviews, and queries to the agency 
leadership.  It then determines (on the basis of these qualitative methods) whether a given 
recommendation is implemented sometime during the next four years.127  It turns out that 
a whopping 79% of recommendations are implemented.  Obviously there’s a lot more 
work to be done on these recommendations.  For example, the extent to which 
recommendations are adopted may be endogenous to what the recommendation is – with 
simpler ones (i.e., “write a report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the Secret 
Service”) being implemented much more than complicated or difficult ones (“reduce the 
extent to which the Secret Service works on simple credit card fraud cases instead of 
critical infrastructure protection”).  I strongly suspect that the adoption of 
recommendations is influenced by political factors, such as the extent of division in 
appropriations and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the agency in question.  It’s 
also quite likely that departments with different bureaucratic structures, institutional 
cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige, have different reactions to the GAO 
recommendations.  What makes little sense is to blithely reject the relevance of these 
audit bureaucracies – even if they don’t currently do the sorts of audits that would help us 
learn more about the use and abuse of targeted discretion. 
B.  Neither Do Legislators
Another possible setting where targeted discretion audits could take place is in the 
legislature, where hearings to oversee the bureaucracy are routine and legislators often 
complain loudly about what agencies have done.  As it turns out, most legislative 
oversight activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing targeted 
discretion.  In Part III I suggest some of the reasons why, as with the audit bureaucracies, 
there seem to be so few audits of targeted discretion.  In what follows I just want to 
provide a brief outline of what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how 
this is different from targeted discretion audits.
Soon after legislators arrive in Washington, many of them almost invariably find 
that “oversight” of the bureaucracy has big payoffs.  It lets them achieve desired policy 
goals.  It also lets them claim credit for making the government work more efficiently 
and effectively.  As a consequence, legislative oversight activity takes on a bewildering 
126
 The search involved review the transcripts of all news stories on CNN, CNBC, CBS, NBC, ABC, and 
Fox News available on Westlaw, with airdates between January 2002 and January 2005.  Transcripts of 
local news programs would probably pick  up additional stories.
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 Interview with GAO Official # 1 (January 2005).  The agency (quite plausibly) assumes that if a 
recommendation is not implemented within four years of being made, it probably will not be.
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array of forms, including – among others – formal committee and subcommittee hearings, 
staff investigations of bureaucratic practices, direct contact between a legislator and an 
agency’s leadership, meetings with the White House to enlist its support in pressing a 
bureaucracy into service, and control of the appropriations process.128  In the mid-1980s, 
political scientists Mat McCubbins and Tom Schwartz introduced what has become an 
incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of the 
bureaucracy.129  Police patrol oversight involves legislators using their time, staff, and 
other resources to engage in fairly constant vigilance of agency outputs – primarily 
through staff investigations and committee hearings.  In contrast, “fire alarm” oversight 
requires less constant attention from legislators and their staff.  Instead, legislators wait 
for “fire alarms” to be pulled by interest groups and portions of the public (occasionally, 
perhaps when galvanized by media attention to some perceived regulatory problem).  To 
encourage this sort of activity, legislators create procedures such as the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act that let groups more 
easily learn what’s going on.  Legislators rely on these parties to assist (implicitly) in the 
oversight process.  In short, fire alarms involve two related features: (a) reliance on 
interest groups (or, on occasion, a politically engaged citizenry), and (b) episodic 
legislative responses to instances where these groups 
The fire alarm concept is almost the opposite of a random audit.  Unless 
legislators directly create a procedure to audit targeted discretion (they haven’t so far), 
then fire alarms would virtually never involve auditing, but rather sharp responses when 
problems have already surfaced.  Moreover, because targeted discretion often (though not 
always) affects individuals or groups without ready access to political power, fire alarm 
oversight would be particularly unlikely to uncover problems.  In contrast, police patrol 
methods are much more consistent with the kind of audits I describe.  Yet there is little 
evidence from congressional testimony and hearings that this is the sort of oversight that 
legislators do directly.  In fact, what their public statements seem to suggest is that if 
anyone is doing the kinds of audits that reveal problems with government, it’s the GAO 
and the IG Offices, not their own staff.130
No doubt that congressional investigations often uncover important trends or 
problems in bureaucratic activity, whether they are triggered by fire alarms or they arise 
from more pervasive police patrol methods.  Nonetheless, those very same investigations 
also run into trouble getting access to information about how discretionary decisions are 
made.  Moreover, while it is perhaps it’s true that some forms of legislative control can 
substitute for other mechanisms – like audits – two basic facts might nonetheless make 
audits of executive discretion distinctive compared to most of what legislatures, courts, 
and audit bureaucracies currently undertake.  (1) Legislators train their attention on what 
catches their attention, not on a random sample of discretionary decisions.  Decisions that 
are not reviewed randomly provide a biased sample, which can skew the reported results 
either because of inherent characteristics in the sample or because the players being 
“audited” strategically distort what they’re doing in the decisions more likely to be 
128 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY (1990).
129 See Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166-68 (1984).
130 See, e.g., Light, supra note 42, at 42
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audited.  Cases that are not reviewed at all don’t become the subject of any legislative, 
political, or public pressure.  We don’t learn anything if we don’t review something
relevant to the discretionary decisions made constantly throughout the government.  (2) 
Even when legislators and their staff choose to focus on something, their oversight does 
not necessarily imply review of specific decisions.  As with the audit bureaucracies, 
oversight hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency’s policy priorities or 
its handling of obvious crises.  While staff may occasionally review random samples of 
case files, this is not a routine component of legislative hearings.  From a prescriptive 
point of view, the results may provide less explicit – and instead more ambiguous –
findings, which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether government is 
performing effectively.
IV.
AUDITS FACE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poor job of overseeing targeted executive 
discretion, because the standard of deference is often set too high to give a meaningful 
chance of discovering problems.  Audits could tell us more, at a reasonable cost.  But 
they rarely happen.  Why?
A.  Observers Sometimes Fail to Distinguish Between Targeted Discretion and Policy 
Judgments
I began this article by distinguishing among different kinds of discretion.  Some 
of government’s work is about writing executive orders to determine when covert 
operations are warranted, designing regulatory rules for disposing of nuclear waste, or 
similar tasks that involve broad policy judgments.  Other decisions involve discrete 
choices to impose costs (or deliver benefits) primarily on specific individuals and groups, 
generally in accordance with some implicit standard or broad policy goal.  Most of my 
argument is about how to improve our ability to learn how bureaucratic institutions use 
the second kind of flexibility, targeted discretion, to shape our welfare and security.  
Although I have already acknowledged and discussed some overlap between such 
targeted discretion and policy judgments, they are really quite different.  Policy 
judgments are about interpreting statutes, ambiguous facts, or policy considerations that 
apply across an entire class of cases.  Targeted discretion involves a discrete choice that 
allocates burdens or benefits primarily onto an individual or group.  Judgments of the 
former kind lie at the core of regulatory rulemaking, on the other hand, are not.  The latter 
kind of discretion is instead primarily about applying legal rules, implicit standards, or 
policy judgments onto specific cases.  Indeed, even when targeted decisions seem 
entangled with broad policy judgments, we can draw distinctions and make the former 
kind of decision subject to a different sort of review (one that might even take as its 
standard the policy judgment itself).  Because courts and some commentators fail to fully 
distinguish between these two kinds of decisions, it’s often unclear just why audits would 
be appropriate.  This also blurs the distinction between formal audits and the many audit-
like political mechanisms that review the actions of government bureaucracies, like 
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Inspector General reports on broad program characteristics and objectives, as well as 
congressional fire-alarm type investigations.131
Lumping together these two kinds of discretion has the unfortunate effect of 
making it seem harder to design an effective means of reviewing executive discretion.  
From a court’s perspective, deference probably seems more attractive if discretion seems 
to be about policy, because courts are so often assumed to lack the accountability and 
expertise to make broad policy judgments across large numbers of cases.  Earlier I 
suggested that it might be possible to audit policy judgments such as those underlying
regulatory rules, but doing so would almost certainly require different procedures.  This 
has not stopped lawyers, judges, and scholars from often discussing discretion as if it 
were one thing.  And courts make deference decisions that draw no distinction between 
supporting cases cited that concern targeted discretion, and those concerning broader 
policy judgments. 
B.  Political Actors Have Polarizing Incentives
A second likely reason why audits of targeted discretion have so rarely 
materialized thus far has to do with the incentives shaping the behavior of two important 
sets of players who have stakes in the work of the executive branch.  Officials in the 
executive branch (and their allies in the legislature) obviously matter because they could
institute an audit system internally.  They could support its implementation by the GAO 
and IG offices.  Or they could advocate for it in the legislature.  The other set of players 
involves those legislators (and their allies among organized interest groups) who are 
generally opposed to expansive power in the executive branch.132  The problem, in a 
nutshell, is this:  Executive authorities and their allies will tend to want more discretion, 
and less review.  Unless they have a good reason for trying to cut down on their 
flexibility in order to send a costly signal of some kind to overcome a commitment 
problem,133 these players would probably prefer to avoid the embarrassment of an audit 
that does not show them succeeding, and to retain the benefits of the flexibility implied 
by that discretion.  On the other hand, those who advocate against executive power may 
gain something from keeping the debate polarized, which allows them to retain an issue 
that can galvanize supporters.  And depending on the situation, some such advocates 
might prefer to hold out for winning more stringent review across the board instead of 
settling for a compromise.
Executive branch officials would be loath to part with discretion, for at least two 
reasons.  First, discretion helps executive branch authorities carry out the functions that 
they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the country, prevailing in 
131 See supra Part II (discussing the work of the GAO and IG Offices).
132
 Obviously there are still other players who matter.  There may be moderate legislators, for example, who 
have an interest in restraining abuses but fundamentally accept the argument that intrusive judicial review 
may be too costly.  I suspect both that these actors could play a crucial and constructive role in promoting 
bureaucratic changes that could contribute to improvements in how we oversee targeted discretion.  I also 
imagine that their numbers have been thinned by the increasing polarization of politics described by some 
recent work among political scientists.  See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, 
Political Polarization and Income Inequality, Princeton University Department of Politics: Working Paper 
(January 27, 2003)(on file with author).
133
 For a discussion of this possibility, see Cuéllar, supra note 65.
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military operations abroad, or (at least some of the time) keeping industrial workplaces 
safe.  Discretion is also valuable because it helps create certain impressions among 
superiors, legislators on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.  
People respond to what they can see.  Targeted discretion lets government officials (or 
their subordinates) choose what seems to be happening in a given area of the law.  It 
stands to reason that losing some of this power is not a welcome prospect.  Neither is it 
desirable to face the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come with 
more stringent audits.  One might expect supporters of executive power in the legislature 
to take a similar position.134
What about legislators and interest groups concerned about limiting executive 
power?  Think first of the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is 
doing.  Political scientists have had a great deal to say about how legislators oversee the 
bureaucracy.  A now-classic strand of literature distinguishes between “fire-alarm” 
oversight prompted by some interest group complaint or dramatic visible failure in the 
executive branch, and “police patrol” methods that involve steady monitoring of the 
bureaucracy week after week.135  Police patrol methods seem to encompass audits.  But 
as the literature persuasively establishes, legislators don’t always want to use that tactic 
because it is costly.  Even assuming that the conditions are present to make these 
legislators want to use police patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group 
to complain, it’s not obvious that the critics of executive power would want to press for 
rigorous audits instead of simply polarizing the debate or attempting to embarrass their 
political opponents.136  A highly polarized debate has some benefits.  It may galvanize 
support among certain constituencies.  And legislators (along with their allies in external 
interest groups) may prefer to win across the board than to support solutions that no 
doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations outside 
government.  If the issue is the treatment of enemy combatants, for example, Human 
Rights Watch may strongly prefer a system where authorities implement the Hamdi
decision in a way that drastically cuts down on executive discretion.  Audits may seem 
like a poor alternative by comparison.  The choice between promoting audits (as a 
compromise) or pressing for a more stringent standard of deference across the board thus 
depends, as before, at least in part on the players’ subjective probabilities.   
Considerably more could be said about the consequences of polarization for 
issues of legal and bureaucratic structure.  The main point, for now, is that polarization 
probably diminishes the extent of political interest in review mechanisms that may be 
socially optimal.  When players have more polarized views about executive branch 
power, substantive policy and law, or both, they probably have less to gain from 
investing in audits or similar approaches.  
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example) legislative power.
135 See McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 130, at 166-67.
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 Of course, audits may in fact embarrass the executive branch.  That depends on what the opponents 
think the audits will reveal.  But whatever political benefits audits can provide must be weighed against the 
opportunity costs that I discuss above. 
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C.  Institutional Inertia Locks In Existing Conceptions of Adjudication
Lawyers constantly think of themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of 
individual clients.  Practicing lawyers join scholarly commentators in thinking of courts 
as direct protectors of the rights of similarly-situated individuals.  These frames are in 
some tension with the idea of reviewing fewer cases in exchange for reviewing them 
more thoroughly.  Adjudication is often perceived as embodying at least two important 
characteristics.  First, if adjudication is going to be available, it is assumed to be a 
recourse that should be available to all similarly-situated parties.  People who have been 
allegedly treated the same should not have different opportunities to vindicate their 
claims.  Circuit splits are a fact of life, but academic lawyers consider them problematic 
precisely because they create distinctions in how similarly situated litigants would be 
treated.  Second, adjudication is supposed to provide a remedy.  Which is why judgments 
that don’t provide a remedy strike some observers as ridiculous, and why some scholars 
have persuasively shown how it makes little sense to think about adjudication 
constitutional rights without “equilibrating” that adjudicatory process with the remedies 
in question.137
As I’ve defined them, audits don’t really conform to these assumptions.  In a 
narrow sense, they randomly privilege some people and not others.  They don’t provide 
an obvious remedy (though it’s certainly possible to fashion one).  They seem, as a result, 
to be ill-fitting proxies for a persistent set of concerns that help justify less deferential 
adjudication.  N doubt it’s true that constitutional provisions and values may require 
adjudication.  Sometimes deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes 
in adjudication.  But it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception of adjudication 
could unduly dampen interest in audits.  It promotes the false sense that the value of 
audits are primarily seen where an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and 
corrected.  Instead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how it 
works.  This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but perhaps it sometimes 
gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about protecting individual rights.  Courts inclined 
to serve as a counterweight can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or 
substantial evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their decisions, 
or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and Inspector General offices 
recently.  Although Vermont Yankee and similar cases preclude the full range of judicial 
elaboration of new procedures, it does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest 
that courts attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the extent to which a 
specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.138
D.  Narrow Conceptions of Auditor Mission Prevail
Which brings us back to how the audit bureaucracies behave.  Like all 
bureaucracies, the GAO and IG Offices are also affected by prevailing conceptions of
what it means for them to do carry out their work.  Government employees who have 
some flexibility to choose what to do and how to do it tend to make choices reflecting –
at least in part – their own sense of the mission they are supposed to carry out.  Those 
137 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
138 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accouuntability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative 
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
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choices can reinforce external perceptions, which in turn affect the work referred to the 
agency, the financial resources it receives, the people who apply for jobs there, and the 
standards used to evaluate whether the agency is succeeding in its work.  Together these 
factors then combine with the more prosaic political pressures both within and outside the 
agency to shape its work environment.  
The GAO and IG offices were created to serve as auditors.  So at least one factor 
shaping the priorities of these bureaucracies would be how the role of an auditor is 
defined.  As far as the legislators who created these bureaucracies are concerned, the 
reference to auditing seems to be taken primarily as a reference to detecting financial 
mismanagement or malfeasance.  In the late 1970s, a GAO report commented on 
legislative plans to create IG offices, and emphasized the urgent importance of auditing 
the finances of government agencies.  A scholarly commentator notes how this report 
emphasized the tenor of the congressional discussion at the time:
Surveying every unit of the federal government, from whole agencies to small 
program offices, GAO found that almost a third had not had a financial audit 
since 1974.  In unusually dramatic prose on the front cover, the report announced: 
“One undred and thirty-three unites, with annual funding in excess of $20 billion, 
told GAO they had not received a financial audit during fiscal years 1974 through 
1976.139
The focus on financial waste and related themes should hardly be surprising, given the 
potential political payoffs of creating bureaucracies that are designed to get rid of “waste, 
fraud, and abuse.”140  It’s not easy to find legislators or executive branch officials in favor 
of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse – though (particularly for the GAO) it’s certainly 
plausible to think that the content and aggressiveness of investigations targeting such 
problems would change depending on the partisan composition of the legislature and 
executive branch.141  It’s also true that legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to 
generate publicity and promote certain policy objectives.142  Nonetheless, to the extent 
that legislators expect these bureaucracies to audit, it seems that they primarily expect 
those audits to focus primarily on money and resources: who spent what funds, why 
government vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees were asked to work 
on some questionable task.  This is despite the wide jurisdictional latitude that the law 
gives both sets of agencies.  There is no doubt that such latitude would allow them to 
effectively audit the quality of the targeted discretionary decisions, but doing so seems 
somewhat in tension with what legislators think of when someone says “GAO” or “IG.”
The same may be largely true of many managers and officials within the agencies 
themselves.  Those officials obviously retain some discretion to make choices about what 
to audit (and what methodology to use) after all the external politics are taken into 
139 See Light, supra note 42, at 42.
140 Id at 43-45.
141 See, e.g., Anne Joseph, The Politics of Auditing, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Economy 
and Government Program, Harvard University (2001).
142 See id. at 44 (noting how “some member[s] of Congress… use IG input to frame issues for resolution.  
However, some members of Congress have been less concerned with policy reform, using the IGs instead 
to score short-term political successes.”). 
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account.  But too, it seems plausible that these agencies were locked in to a financial 
auditing mission.  Many (though certainly not all) Inspectors General have a background 
in financial management or accounting.  So does the Comptroller General, who heads the 
GAO.  Combine this with the fact that both supporters and detractors of greater executive 
power have little incentive to push for audits of targeted discretion, and it starts to look 
like the audit bureaucracies would only focus on targeted discretion sporadically and 
idiosyncratically.  And that’s exactly what they seem to do. 
CONCLUSION
Executive branch lawyers recursively emphasize how dangerous and complicated 
the world is when they argue before a court or submit a legal brief.  So do the lawmakers 
who sell the President’s program in the legislature.  Both urge their audience to accept 
danger and complexity as the hallmarks of a world demanding more discretion and less 
doctrine.  Harder to find among their verbal onslaught is any reference to two indelible 
facts. The first is that executive discretion always carries risks as well as rewards.  There 
is nary a chance for sound governance, or any kind of governance, without discretion.  Its 
existence lets government protect the environment, prosecute serial rapists, keep workers 
safe at industrial sites, and fight battles to protect its citizens.  But history writes a 
damning indictment of discretion’s abuse.  It describes not only how Nixon’s IRS 
embarrassed his enemies, or how Hoover’s FBI libelously fed speculation that slain civil 
rights workers were promiscuous, mentally-ill subversives, but also how even the most 
determined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their mistakes when they 
don’t know they have committed them.  None of this should be surprising given what we 
know about organizations, the people who run them, and the complicated legal mandates 
entrusted to them.  The second fact is how much discretion the executive and its millions 
of workers already have.  
This article considered the implications of these two facts in light of two other 
realities.  Judicial review predictably and systematically fails to constrain the kind of 
executive discretion that most directly affects people and organizations (what I call 
targeted discretion).  And we do next to nothing to audit how that discretion is used, 
despite the presence of at least three different compelling reasons to think that executive 
branch officials will have a relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion.  (1) 
Because some discretionary actions can signal competence and resolve to naïve observers 
among the mass public, executive officials may have an incentive use their discretion to 
create favorable impressions.  (2) Some officials or their employees may be far less 
subtle and engage in willful misconduct that is unlikely to be detected.  (3) And 
organizations may have a harder time learning without external mechanisms to 
systematically review and critique their work. 
It would be a mistake to reject the impact of traditional judicial review on many 
forms of executive discretion.  But it would be equally misguided to assume that courts 
succeed in striking a reasonable balance between targeted discretion’s benefits and its 
many costs.  Instead courts make limited forays into the territory of executive power 
when they hear cases about targeted discretion.  The more costly the courts or legislature 
assume those forays to be, the more deferential the review of targeted discretion.  
Whatever the merits of this approach, it creates a situation where existing methods of 
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court review can serve up the worst of both worlds: no meaningful probability of 
uncovering problems in discretionary decisions, coupled with a prevailing sense that 
courts can still remain the nation’s conscience and protect us from discretion’s darker 
side.
Many who have raised these concerns have done so by taking part in a familiar 
debate about the value of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this 
article does not dismiss the value of that greater scrutiny, it offers an alternative to the 
polarized rhetoric of that debate.  It effectively says: even if one accepts that more 
stringent judicial review is impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct 
result is to let the executive branch’s wheels keep on spinning as they always have.  The 
key to that alternative is to think about the problem of policing executive discretion as an 
information problem.  The value of this approach lies in its potential to help sever the 
connection between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion (both in terms of 
direct review costs and in terms of interference with the valuable characteristics of 
discretion) and the stringency of review.  This property makes audits a promising 
conceptual alternative to judicial review in those instances where it would be preferable 
to study a subset of cases more carefully instead of superficially reviewing all of them.  
Government powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may rightly seem less 
threatening if their use can be effectively monitored through audits or similar procedures.  
It may seem at first as though audits would only work if we lived in a world 
perfect enough to make them unnecessary in the first place.  But the institutional design 
problems associated with auditing executive discretion call for an altogether subtler 
diagnosis.  Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing embrace of judicial 
review, and the concomitant absence of activity auditing targeted discretion.  When 
lawyers and policymakers erase the distinction between targeted discretion and broader 
policy judgments, they unduly restrict the scope of options available to help balance 
discretion’s benefits and costs.  Which is just fine for presidential administrations, 
executive officials, and legislators supporting executive power:  They’re perfectly happy 
to let that power evade more frequent review.  Somewhat counter-intuitively, advocates 
of restraining that power may also have incentives to oppose audit-like approaches as a 
matter of political strategy, because it lets them sound the alarm to their supporters while 
they fight for more aggressive review across the board.  That fight happens in a context 
permeated by persistent (yet ultimately misleading) norms about the appropriate 
relationship between adjudication and review of executive discretion, and similarly 
durable conceptions of what existing auditors should do when they supervise government 
agencies.  Weakening these dynamics may require propitious circumstances and 
Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the “perfect world” that would let us dispense with 
audits (or, indeed, judicial review) altogether.
All of this tells a larger story that is not just about audits, but about the forces 
affecting what we consider to be plausible conceptual alternatives to judicial review when 
we address discretion-related problems.  Judicial review gives judges, lawyers, and 
legislators considerable room to innovate and experiment with different kinds of review 
mechanisms.  On the other hand, traditional court review does some things better than 
others, and in some domains it does little or nothing at all.  Yet we cling to it as the 
premier method, other than perhaps the ill-defined political process itself, for providing 
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some kind of constraint on executive discretion.  We can easily spend another ten 
months, or ten years, with the palliative machinery of the status quo grinding on.  So 
what?  Surely it is naïve to assume reflexively that each unchecked discretionary decision 
amounts to a disaster.  What borders on madness is to think those decisions will turn out 
just fine when existing law lets them so easily escape scrutiny.  Perhaps it will take 
decades to know the full costs of the inevitable mistakes and manipulation that get swept 
under the rug when we freeze the wrong charity’s assets or inspect the wrong containers.  
Then again, we may not be so lucky.
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Figure 2: Comparing Audits to Traditional Judicial Review
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Figure 3:  Why Judicial Review Fails
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Figure 4: Methodology Used in a Stratified Random Sample of GAO and IG Office 
Reports, January 2002 – January 2005
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Figure 5: New York Times Reports on Audit Bureaucracies, January 2002-January 2005
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